考虑零售商竞争的闭环供应链产品担保决策及协调

Product Warranty Decision of Closed-loop Supply Chain Considering Retailer Competitive Behaviors

针对由一个制造商和两个竞争型零售商组成的闭环供应链,研究零售商竞争下产品担保决策及供应链协调问题.分别建立两零售商均不提供担保(无担保)、仅一零售商提供担保(单边担保)和两零售商均提供担保(双边担保)决策模型,研究零售商是否应当提供产品担保服务问题,分析零售商担保决策对最优结果的影响,并与仅一零售商的闭环供应链进行对比.结果表明:制造商倾向于利用多零售渠道分销产品;存在零售商竞争时,两零售商均选择提供产品担保以最大化自身利润;但在“担保水平”维度,两零售商无需进行差异化竞争;双边担保使得消费者获得“高价+高水平担保”产品服务,刺激市场需求,实现“零售商+制造商”双赢,进而提升供应链整体绩效.最后,设计了一成本分担-收益共享契约来协调两零售商均提供担保下的供应链运作,结果证明该契约能有效实现制造商和零售商的帕累托改进.

A Closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)consisting of one manufacturer and two competing retailers was studied to investigate whether to implement the product warranty or not under retailers'competition from the perspective of the retailer.Three decision models under different product warranty decision of retailers were established,including Model N that no retailer implements product warranty,Model NE that only one retailer implements product warranty and Model EE that two retailers implement product warranty simultaneously.In addition,we compared these models with the closed-loop supply chain of only one retailer.The results show that:Manufacturers tend to use dual-channel to distribute their products.Under retailer competition,both of competing retailers in the CLSC should provide product warranty to maximize their own profits simultaneously.But the level of the product warranty provided by one retailer should be undifferentiated from that of his competing retailer.The behavior that two competing retailers provide the same product warranty simultaneously increases optimal retail price and the optimal level of product warranty,and then improve the profit of manufacturers and CLSC.Finally,the role of the cost sharing-revenue sharing contract in the decisions of supply chain members were discussed,and the results show that both the manufacture and retailers could achieve Pareto improvement under the contract.