摘要
认知增强技术的发展中,一种常见的批评指出,由于该类技术需要借助一些外部干预的方式来实现,因此会造成认知者的主体性消减。为应对这一批评,一些学者诉诸于延展心灵论题对认知增强进行辩护,因为该论题将主张,用于增强我们认知能力的人造物同样是心灵的组成部分,所以心灵实际上是得到了放大。然而这种版本的认知增强是不成功的,因为它仍然面对着来自认知现象性问题的质疑。与之不同的是,我们提出,一种可行版本的认知增强需要在延展自我论题下得到解释,而该论题是以对现象性自我的描述为核心的。
During the development of cognitive enhancement technology,a common criticism notes that this sort of technology would cause the decrease of subjectivity due to its way of external interference.To counter this criticism,some authors defend cognitive enhancement by appealing to the extended mind thesis,as it claims that the artifacts,which are used to improve our cognitive ability,are also constituents of mind,thus the mind is so enlarged.This version of cognitive enhancement,however,is unsuccessful,since it is still faced with a doubt posed by the cognitive phenomenology.Unlike this,we suggest that a feasible version of cognitive enhancement should be interpreted based on the extended self thesis,in which the core task is to depict the phenomenal self.
作者
余天放
YU Tianfang(School of Social Development,Yangzhou University,Yangzhou,Jiangsu,225002)
出处
《自然辩证法通讯》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第3期31-40,共10页
Journal of Dialectics of Nature
基金
国家社科基金项目“新兴生命科技的人文风险及其治理路径研究”(项目编号:22VRC030)
扬州大学“青蓝工程”资助。
关键词
延展心灵
延展自我
认知增强
现象性自我
Extended mind
Extended self
Cognitive enhancement
Phenomenal self