新高考改革中的科目选考机制——一个博弈论分析

Subject Selection Mechanism in Chinese College Entrance Exam——A Game-Theoretical Study

新高考改革允许学生自由选择考试科目,但考生为追求高分而进行的策略性科目选择也可能导致意料之外的政策后果。本文研究了科目选考机制下的纳什均衡。研究表明,科目选考制度存在多重纳什均衡的问题,且其中一些均衡可能会导致选考不同学科的人数比例差异过大。选考科目保障机制能够有效缓解这一问题。

The new college entrance examination(NCEE) reform allows students to freely choose examination subjects,but strategic subject selection by students in pursuit of high scores may also lead to unintended policy consequences.We investigate the Nash equilibrium under the new subject selection mechanism and show that there are multiple Nash equilibria in the mechanism,some of which lead to excessively low proportion of students taking some subjects,while the subject selection guarantee mechanism can effectively mitigate this problem.