企业风险承担的微观机制设计——基于股权激励行权业绩条件达标难度的分析

The Micro-Mechanism Design of Corporate Risk-Taking——An Analysis Based on the Target Difficulty of PerformanceVesting Provisions in Stock Incentive Plans

本文以股权激励行权业绩条件达标难度为视角,探讨微观激励机制的设计如何影响企业的风险承担。研究发现,行权业绩条件达标难度与企业风险承担水平之间呈U形关系,表明管理层在不同业绩难度下会选择适当的风险策略以获取股权激励收益。激励对象影响风险决策的能力越高,或盈余管理等机会主义手段的可实施性越低,该U形关系越明显。本文丰富了风险承担激励的相关文献,也为公司合理设计股权激励方案提供了参考。

We investigate how micro-mechanism design would affect corporate risk-taking from the perspective of the target difficulty of performance-vesting provisions in stock incentive plans and find a U shape between the target difficulty and the level of corporate risk-taking.It implies that managers would strategically determine the risk-taking level under different target difficulties to achieve a higher payoff.Besides,the U shape manifests for firms with powerful vesting managers and less feasibility of managing earnings.Overall,the findings not only extend the literature on motivating corporate risk-taking,but also shed some light on the stock incentive contract designs.