竞争性决断:一个无共识决策模式——以慈善法中税收政策的制定为例

Competitive Arbitrariness in China’s Policy Decision-Making——An Example of the Legislative Process of Tax Policy in Charity Law

虽然共识模式很好地体现了中国决策过程的制度特征,但仍存在类型代表不足以及概念模糊等问题。本文基于中国政治体制和治理机制提出了“竞争性决断”这一概念,该概念有效地融合了决策过程的民主性和高效性。文章以慈善法中税收政策的制定为例,从权力运行过程中纵向的决断和横向的博弈两个维度构建决策分析框架。通过打开决策“黑箱”分析了在无共识情况下各行动者之间的互动过程。研究发现,税收政策的制定本质上是各行动者基于自身的资源禀赋和权力进行竞争的结果。在慈善法的起草阶段,各部门在协商无果的情况下选择搁置争议;在审议阶段,各方开展权力博弈,在无法有效达成共识的情况下,基于行动者不同的权力对比,搁置争议或寻求上级决策成为主要策略,上级决断有效保障了决策的效率。因此,从权力的分配和行使出发才能更好地理解中国特色的决策过程,也有助于更好地理解全过程人民民主的实践过程。这一概念有效涵盖“共识决策”等类型,增加了对决策过程的解释力。

Although the consensus model reflects the institutional characteristics of China’s policy decision-making,it ignores the distribution of power and its exercise in the political system.This paper proposes a decision-making model of competitive arbitrariness from the perspective of political bureaucracy and governance.It distinguishes different decision types from two dimensions:arbitrariness and power distribution.The article takes the formulation process of tax policy in charity law as a case to explore the decision-making process among the various actors in the legislation without consensus.It found that the formulation of tax incentives is essentially the result of the game of each subject based on its own power.In the absence of effective consensus,it is a major response to set aside disputes or seek arbitrariness based on institutional requirements.