摘要
地摊作为一种边缘化的商业经济模式,在为消费者提供实惠便利服务的同时,与城市精细化治理存在一定摩擦,多次经历放开又叫停的发展困境。以地摊经济发展融入城市治理为目标,为探讨相关利益主体间的互动机理,结合前景理论与动态奖惩机制构建“摊贩-地方政府-消费者”三方演化博弈模型,运用SD仿真剖析系统的动态演化过程。结果表明:初始策略选择并不影响最终演化结果;加大奖惩和降低成本等管理模式无法长期奏效;政府应针对性地进行精细化治理,提升增量收益,发展常态有效的管理模式。
As a marginalized commercial economic model,while providing consumers with affordable and convenient services,street-stall economy has a certain friction with urban fine governance,which has caused it to repeatedly experience the development dilemma of opening and stopping.To integrate the development of street-stall economy into urban governance,and explore the interaction mechanism among relevant stakeholders,combined with the prospect theory and dynamic reward and punishment mechanism,a tripartite evolutionary game model of"street venders,local governments and consumers"was constructed.The SD simulation was used to analyze the dynamic evolution process of the system.The results showed that the initial strategy selection did not affect the final evolution results,and management models such as increasing rewards and punishments and reducing costs could not work in the long run.The government should carry out targeted and refined governance,increase incremental revenue,and develop a normal and effective management model.
作者
彭勃
王喆
唐攀
PENG Bo;WANG Zhe;TANG Pan(School of Safety Science and Emergency Management,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan 430070,China;不详)
出处
《武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版)》
CAS
2024年第1期109-116,共8页
Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Information & Management Engineering
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目(21&ZD127)
国家社会科学基金一般项目(23BGL280)。
关键词
地摊经济
演化博弈
SD仿真
前景理论
城市治理
street-stall economy
evolutionary game
SD simulation
prospect theory
urban governance