竞争环境下非对称平台的兼并策略及社会福利研究

Merger strategy and social welfare of asymmetric platform in competitive environment

文章以双边市场理论为基础,考虑了平台间市场规模不对称的特征,将兼并模式分为强者扩张、弱者自救两种,讨论不同兼并模式采取不同运营策略(独立运营,合并运营)时平台的决策变化,研究了竞争环境下非对称平台的兼并策略,社会总福利变化及反垄断监管等相关问题.研究结果表明:1)在不出现“兼并悖论”现象的前提下,若平台选择强者扩张的兼并模式,则其更趋向于选择合并运营策略以获取更大的利润;若平台选择弱者自救的兼并模式,其兼并策略的选择与市场规模差的大小有关;2)在不同兼并策略下,平台兼并行为均有较大可能性增强社会总福利;3)在不同的交叉网络外部性强度和兼并后不同的运营策略下,市场监管部门对平台兼并行为的反垄断监察应有不同的侧重点.

This paper is based on the bilateral market theory and considers the asymmetric market scale between platforms.We divide the merger model into two types:Strong expansion and weak self-rescue.The decision-making changes of platforms are analyzed when adopting different operation strategies(independent or combined operation).This paper also examines the merger strategies of asymmetric platforms under the competitive conditions and the changes in total social welfare and anti-monopoly supervision.The results indicate that,first,if the platform chooses the strong expansion merger mode,it tends to pursue the strategy of merger operation to obtain greater profits,assuming there is no“merger paradox”phenomenon.Second,the merger strategy of the self-help of the weak platform is related to the difference in market size between platforms.Third,the platform’s merger behavior under different strategies is likely to enhance overall social welfare.Finally,the market supervision department should focus on different aspects of anti-monopoly supervision under different cross-network externalities and post-merger operation strategies.