消费者展厅行为下的制造商渠道选择策略研究

Channel Selection of Manufacturers with Consumers Showrooming and Pseudo-Showrooming Purchchase Behavior

在直销和分销并存的双渠道供应链中,针对消费者展厅和反展厅行为,本文构建了制造商占主导地位的“线上直销线下分销”和“线下直销线上分销”两种模式下两周期博弈模型,探讨了模型的简化运算方法,分析了制造商面对消费者展厅和反展厅行为时的最优渠道选择。研究表明:在市场总人数不变的情况下,初始到达直销渠道的消费者数量越多,制造商的收益越高;当消费者转换购买意愿较大时,制造商的最优决策为选择线下直销线上分销模式,同时能实现市场的帕累托改进;初始到达直销渠道的消费者数量越大,制造商选择线下直销线上分销模式的可能性越大。

In a dual-channel supply chain where coexist direct sales and distribution,aiming at consumer showroom and pseudo-showroom behavior,based on game theory,this paper constructs a two-cycle game model of manufacturers dominate the two models of“online direct and offline distribution”and“offline direct and on-line distribution”,discusses the simplified calculation method of the model,analyzes the optimal channel choice of manufacturers when facing consumer showroom and pseudo-showroom behavior.The main conclusions can be drawn as follows.Firstly,With the total number of people in the market remaining unchanged,The greater the number of consumers who reach the direct sales channel,the higher the revenue for the manufac-turer;Secondly,When consumers are more willing to switch to purchase,the best decision of the manufacturer is to choose the“offline direct and online distribution”mode,realize the Pareto improvement of the market;Thirdly,The greater the number of consumers who initially arrive at the direct sales channel,the manufac-turer more likely to choose an“offline direct and online distribution”model.