考虑成本信息透明和学习效应的跨期定价策略

Intertemporal Pricing Strategy Considering Cost Information Transparency and Learning Effect

由于企业自身或第三方机构的披露,企业的生产成本对于消费者来说日益透明。与此同时,对于耐用品生产企业,往往存在成本学习效应,即企业在重复制造生产过程中可以降低后期的生产成本。针对制造企业面对策略型消费者的动态定价问题,构建了两周期信号博弈模型,研究了成本信息透明和成本学习效应分别对企业的跨期价格歧视策略、利润、消费者战略等待决策和消费者剩余的影响。通过对比成本信息透明和不透明下的企业及消费者策略发现:当成本学习效应较小时,成本信息透明整体上使高成本企业和消费者受益,使低成本企业受损;当成本学习效应较大时,成本信息透明仍使高成本企业受益,使低成本企业和消费者受损。成本学习效应的增强使高成本企业受益,使低成本企业受损,使消费者受益。

As a result of the disclosure of the firm itself or third-parties,a firm’s product-cost information is increasingly transparent to consumers.Meanwhile,durable products usually undergo a production learning effect,which allows the firm to reduce its future unit production cost in the process of repeated manufacturing.Cost transparency,production learning effect and strategic consumers are considered simultaneously in this study.Thus,research questions could be proposed as follows.First,how does the production learning effect affect the pricing strategy and profit of a firm,as well as consumer surplus?Second,under the existence of production learning effect,what is the firm's cost information disclosure strategy?What are the functions of cost transparency?Finally,will the production learning effect change the role of cost transparency?To answer the above questions,a two-period signaling game model is established to explore how cost transparency and learning effect affect the firm’s intertemporal price discrimination and profit,as well as consumers’strategic waiting decision and surplus.The strategies of the firm and consumers under cost transparency and non-transparency are analyzed,and the impacts of cost transparency and production learning effect are examined.Parameterβis used to indicate the degree of production learning effect.First,the results demonstrate thatβcan divide the equilibrium outcome into separating and pooling outcomes under information asymmetry.Second,the enhancement of production learning effect is beneficial to both the high-cost firm and consumers and harmful to the low-cost firm.Finally,when the production learning effect is not significant,cost transparency will benefit both the high-cost firm and consumers and harm the low-cost firm;when this effect is significant,cost transparency will still benefit the high-cost firm but damage both the low-cost firm and consumers.These conclusions can provide theoretical guidance for the research on strategic consumers and information asymmetry in the future.Furthermore,firms and consumers can also gain practical experience from our study.