C&T和政府补贴下的绿色技术选择与产品定价研究

Green Technology Selection and Product Pricing Research under C&T and Government Subsidies

本文以碳排放总量控制与交易(C&T)为政策背景,通过构建政府福利最大化与控排企业利润最大化的Stackelberg博弈模型,探讨政府不同补贴方式(单位产品补贴和绿色技术成本补贴)下控排企业绿色技术选择以及产品定价决策,并进一步分析不同政府补贴方式对控排企业碳排放以及社会福利的影响。研究结果表明:与绿色技术成本补贴相比,单位产品补贴下的最优价格更高,而且会导致更多的绿色生产和消费。而绿色技术成本补贴下的碳排放更低,企业利润更高;政府补贴总预算相同时,绿色技术成本补贴更有可能激励企业投资绿色技术。研究结果也表明,政府补贴并不能保证控排企业投资绿色技术和总碳排放减少,而是取决于绿色技术成本的范围、碳减排率以及控排企业的碳排放强度。此外,单位产品补贴下的社会福利要优于绿色技术成本补贴下的社会福利。数值实验验证了本文的有关研究结果。最后给出了政府补贴政策的相关建议。

In this paper,under the background of carbon emission cap and trade(C&T)policy,the Stackelberg game model of maximizing government welfare and controlling and emission enterprise’s profit is constructed to explore the choice of green technology and product pricing decisions of controlling and emission enterprises under different government subsidies(unit product subsidy and green technology cost subsidy).Furthermore,the influence of different government subsidies on carbon emission control enterprises and social welfare is further analyzed.The results show that compared with the cost subsidy of green technology,the optimal price of unit product subsidy is higher,and will lead to more green production and consumption.The cost subsidy of green technology has lower carbon emissions and higher corporate profits.When the total budget of government subsidy is the same,the cost subsidy of green technology is more likely to encourage enterprises to invest in green technology.It is shown that government subsidies cannot guarantee the investment in green technologies and the reduction of total carbon emissions of enterprises,but depend on the range of green technol‐ogy cost,carbon emission reduction rate and carbon emission intensity of enterprises.In addition,the social welfare under unit product subsidy is better than the social welfare under green technology cost subsidy.Numeri‐cal experiments verify the results of this paper.Finally,some suggestions on government subsidy policy are given.