谁为企业低效担责——家族管理者的堑壕行为与效应

Who can Account for the Performance of Inefficiency——Trenching Behavior and Its Effects of Family Managers

通过分析高管离任过程中家族管理者的决策行为,提出“替罪羊”假说。基于2014—2020年家族管理者所经营的上市公司数据,实证检验高管离任中的“替罪羊”现象及其对企业绩效的影响。研究发现:(1)家族管理者在高管离任过程中存在堑壕行为,即使企业经营绩效处于低下水平,家族管理者因独特权威和庇护型治理机制而赢得留任优势,其他高管则成为“替罪羊”离开企业;(2)高管离任中的“替罪羊”现象并不会损害家族企业整体价值,家族管理者留任而非家族成员型高管离任将在短期内有助于改进企业的市场价值。

The paper firstly analyzed the decision-making behaviors of family managers during the process of top managers'turnover,and then proposed the hypothesis of"scapegoat".Based on the data of the listed companies run by family managers from 2014 to 2020,the paper empirically tested the"scapegoat"phenomenon during the process of top managers'turnover,as well as its impact on enterprise performance.The findings were as follows.(I)During the process of top managers'turnover,family managers had trenching behaviors.That was,even if enterprise operational performance was at a low level,family managers could stay in office due to their authority and sheltered governance mechanism,while other top managers had to be the"scapegoats"and leave the company.(2)The"scapegoat"phenomenon could help enterprises improve market value in the short term,rather than damage the value of family business.