摘要
黑格尔与马克思都重视人的尊严和价值,强调需要通过制度化的解决方案实现相互承认的尊严。但黑格尔停留在思辨的地基上,他关于尊严的诠释是在精神承认框架下的一种制度考量。马克思不同于黑格尔,他更多地是立足实践,即深入到资本主义生产方式中去探讨人的尊严何以可能。马克思对黑格尔尊严观的批判性超越在今天能使我们明晰:尊严的主体不是抽象的主体,而是现实的、活生生的人;尊严不是抽象的精神承认,而是从“物化承认”转变为真正的“相互承认”;尊严不是抽象的理性问题,而以生产力的物质力量为基础。
Hegel and Marx both value human dignity and value, and emphasize the need for institutionalized solutions to achieve mutual recognition of dignity. But Hegel remained on the basis of speculation and his interpretation of dignity was an institutional consideration within the framework of spiritual recognition. Marx is different from Hegel, he focused more on practice, that is, he delves into the capitalist mode of production to explore how human dignity is possible. Marx’s critical transcendence of Hegel’s conception of dignity can make us clear today: the subject of dignity is not an abstract subject, but a real, living person;dignity is not abstract spiritual recognition, but the real “mutual recognition” from “materialized recognition”;dignity is not an abstract matter of reason, but is based on the material power of the productive forces.
作者
章道德
ZHANG Dao-de(School of Marxism,Wannan Medical College,Wuhu Anhui 241002,China)
出处
《齐齐哈尔大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
2024年第2期42-45,共4页
Journal of Qiqihar University(Philosophy & Social Science Edition)
基金
安徽省高校科学研究重点项目:精神生活共同富裕的人学诠解(2022AH051201)
皖南医学院校级科研项目:新时代高校意识形态安全机制构建研究(WKS2022J03)
皖南医学院博士科研启动基金项目:唯物史观与人的尊严(WYRCQD2023033)。
关键词
尊严
思辨
承认
马克思
黑格尔
dignity
speculation
recognition
Marx
Hegel