摘要
为研究网络货运健康发展条件,构建由货运平台,政府监管部门与司机三方主体组成的博弈系统。首先,构建博弈系统收益矩阵,并根据Malthusian复制动态思想构建各主体复制动态方程;然后,联立博弈系统三方复制动态方程,进行系统稳定性分析,得到系统内部7个稳定性条件;最后,结合数值仿真,基于理论最优策略集(严格管理,积极监管,合规营运)进行演化路径分析,得出博弈系统内部影响因素与演化机理。结果表明:若平台与司机选择严格与合规策略,政府监管部门必将选择积极策略助推网络货运行业健康发展;客户举报率对博弈系统演化结果有重要影响,较高的举报率驱使着司机合规营运,过低的客户举报率则将导致司机策略演化不稳定;在政府监管部门与货运平台严格积极监管的前提下,合规营运成本决定着司机策略的选择,营运成本越小,货运司机越趋向选择合规营运策略;货运平台与政府需要制订合理的奖惩制度,推动司机向合规营运策略演化,以保证行业健康发展;媒体网络舆论一定程度上遏制了各个主体的违规消极行为,但无法解决网络货运发展困境,行业的健康发展需要博弈系统内各主体的协同努力;货运平台对司机的安全培训能有效降低服务过程意外发生概率,并提高平台向严格管理策略演化的速率。
In order to study the conditions for the healthy development of network freight transportation,a competition system composed of freight transportation platform,government regulator and driver is constructed.Firstly,the competition system payoff matrix is constructed,and the dynamic equations of each subject are constructed according to the Malthusian replication dynamic idea.Then,the three-party dynamic equations of the joint competition system are replicated to carry out the stability analysis of the system,and 7 stability conditions within the system are obtained.Finally,combined with numerical simulation,based on the theoretical optimal strategy set(strict management,active supervision,compliant operation),the evolution path analysis is carried out,and the internal influencing factors and evolution mechanism of the competition system are derived.The result shows that(1)if platforms and drivers choose strict and compliant strategies,government regulators will choose positive strategies to promote the healthy development of the online freight industry;(2)the customer reporting rate has an important impact on the evolution of the competition system,a higher rate of reporting drives the drivers to comply with the operation,while a low rate of customer reporting will lead to instability in the evolution of the driver’s strategy;(3)in the context of strict and positive regulation of the government regulators and freight transport platforms under the premise of strict and positive supervision by government regulators and freight platforms,the cost of compliant operation determines the choice of drivers’strategies,and the smaller the cost of operation,the more drivers tend to choose compliant operation strategies;(4)freight platforms and the government need to formulate a reasonable system of rewards and punishments to promote the evolution of drivers’compliant operation strategies in order to ensure the healthy development of the industry;(5)the illegal and negative behaviors of the main bodies is curbed by the media network public opinion to a certain extent,but it cannot solve the development dilemma of network freight transport,the healthy development of the industry needs to game the system of the main bodies,and the healthy development of the industry requires the concerted efforts of all subjects in the gaming system;(6)the safety training of drivers by the freight transportation platform can reduce the probability of accidents effectively during the service process and increase the rate of the platform’s evolution towards a strict management strategy.
作者
徐新扬
杨扬
XU Xin-yang;YANG Yang(Faculty of Transportation Engineering,Kunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming Yunnan 650500,China)
出处
《公路交通科技》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2024年第1期186-194,共9页
Journal of Highway and Transportation Research and Development
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71864022)。
关键词
运输经济
监管困境
演化博弈
货运平台
稳定性分析
transport economics
regulatory dilemma
evolutionary competition
freight platform
stability analysis