考虑损失规避和补货策略的VMI供应链协调

Coordination of VMI Supply Chain with Loss Aversion and Replenishment Tactic

大量实证研究表明补货可以降低缺货损失,同时企业的损失规避行为也影响其决策问题,无论是补货策略还是损失规避行为最终都可以影响供应链协调状态,但现有研究大多仅考虑含有损失规避的供应链协调问题,忽视了补货策略的影响。本文则是在考虑供应商采取补货策略的基础上,针对由一个损失规避型供应商和一个风险中性型零售商组成的两级VMI供应链中,采用了心理账户分离的方法来刻画供应商的损失规避行为,并分别构建了风险分散契约、期权契约和补贴契约下的供应链协调模型,进而探讨了供应商的损失规避行为对供应链协调状态的影响。研究表明:上述三类协调契约均可使供应链达到协调状态以及实现Pareto改进;相对于期权契约和补贴契约,供应商更倾向于选择风险分散契约来协调供应链;一旦供应商的损失规避程度过高,期权契约和补贴契约则将无法用于协调供应链。研究所得结果有助于丰富VMI供应链协调管理方法。

In today’s globalized and highly competitive business environment,supply chain management has become a crucial factor for the success of enterprises.In this complex and dynamic network,supplier-managed inventory(VMI),supplier loss-avoidance behavior,and supplier replenishment strategies have emerged as significant factors influencing supply chain coordination and efficiency.Understanding and optimizing these aspects are paramount for enterprises to maintain a competitive edge in the market.Firstly,VMI,as a modern supply chain management model,has gradually garnered widespread attention from businesses over the past few decades.VMI involves suppliers proactively managing the inventory of their customers,facilitating information sharing and real-time responsiveness.This close collaboration not only aids in reducing inventory levels and increasing inventory turnover but also mitigates uncertainty within the supply chain.However,current research primarily focuses on the implementation and advantages of VMI,with limited exploration of the psychological factors and supplier behavior associated with VMI.Secondly,supplier loss-avoidance behavior is a crucial aspect influencing supply chain decisions.When faced with potential losses,enterprises often adopt measures to avoid them,aiming to minimize the likelihood of loss occurrence.This behavior in the supply chain may manifest risk aversion,sensitivity to losses,and impact on decision-making.However,research on the specific effects of supplier loss-avoidance behavior in supply chain management is still relatively scarce.Lastly,the replenishment strategy of suppliers is a key factor influencing inventory levels and supply chain flexibility.Effective replenishment strategies assist enterprises in better coping with market demand fluctuations,reducing stockouts,and enhancing customer satisfaction.However,within the context of VMI,the relationship between supplier replenishment strategies and coordination contracts,as well as their impact on supply chain performance,requires further an in-depth investigation.In conclusion,a comprehensive understanding of the relationships among supplier-managed inventory,supplier loss-avoidance behavior,and supplier replenishment strategies is crucial for optimizing supply chain coordination,reducing risks,and enhancing efficiency.Based on this,we then discuss the supplier’s optimal inventory problem in a two-level VMI supply chain consisting of a single loss-averse supplier and a single risk-neutral retailer.In order to minimize losses from output shortfalls,the supplier chooses a replenishment strategy and employs a mental account separation method to characterize its loss aversion.The retailer,on the other hand,incentivizes the supplier to produce through contractual means to improve the overall operational efficiency of the supply chain,and the main contributions are as follows.First,supply chain coordination models under risk diversification contract,option contract and subsidy contract are established respectively,and it is found that all three contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve Pareto improvement.In other words,both parties in the supply chain can induce suppliers to produce from the perspective of risk sharing by adopting appropriate risk diversification contracts,option contracts and subsidy contracts,so as to improve the overall operational efficiency of the supply chain and achieve long-term good cooperation.Second,the above three types of contracts are compared and analyzed,and it is found that the performance of both parties to the transaction under the risk diversification contract is higher than that under other contracts.In other words,suppliers are more willing to adopt risk diversification contract to coordinate the supply chain.Finally,the impact of the degree of loss aversion on the Pareto improvement region of the above three types of contracts is discussed,which shows that suppliers will not choose option contracts and subsidy contracts once the degree of loss aversion they face is too large.The model setup in this paper is idealized and only considers the“one-to-one”case,and the next step will be to discuss the VMI supply chain coordination under the replenishment strategy adopted by multiple suppliers.In addition,this paper only considers the VMI supply chain problem based on replenishment and loss aversion behavior,and does not involve the promotional effort behavior of the trading participants,so the next step will also consider the VMI supply chain coordination problem when the loss aversion supplier adopts both sales effort and replenishment strategies.