心灵哲学视角下人工智能体犯罪之否定阐释

Negative Elaboration of Artificial Intelligence Body’s Criminal Offenses from the Perspective of Philosophy of Mind

人工智能体作为刑法主体的可行性在法学界争议颇多,通过心灵哲学的角度,引入塞尔中文屋和查莫斯哲学僵尸概念,从人工智能体萌芽时期到近期呼声极高的ChatGPT等事务,分析梳理行为主义和图灵测试的缺陷,从而对人工智能自由意志属性做出否定判断,进而建议取消其作为刑法主体前提。

The feasibility of artificial intelligence body as the subject of criminal law is controversial in the legal academy,through the perspective of philosophy of mind,introducing the concept of Selwyn Chinese house and Chalmers philosophical zombie,from the budding period of artificial intelligence body to the recent call for the ChatGPT and other affairs,analysing and sorting out the defects of behaviourism and the Turing test,so as to make a negative judgement on the attribute of free will of the artificial intelligence,and then suggesting to abolish it as the subject premise of criminal law.