跨国河流水污染合作治理的微分博弈模型

Cooperation for transnational river pollution control:A differential game model

为了在跨国河流污染存在单向外部性的情况下,提高污染治理的效果.使用微分博弈的方法,构建了各国单独治污,污染补偿,“谁污染,谁治理”三种模式,分析了治污决策连续动态变化的两个上下游国家,得出三种模式下的上下游国家的均衡的排污量,治污量和社会福利函数.研究表明,只有当技术进步带来单位治污成本较小和排污所造成的损失处于一定区间时,“谁污染,谁治理”模式能够兼顾污染治理和经济发展.对于下游国家,排污损失较小时,污染补偿模式更加有利;排污损失较大时,单独治理模式更加有利;排污损失处于一定区间时,“谁污染,谁治理”模式更加有利.

In order to improve the effect of pollution control in the case of unidirectional externality of transnational river pollution,this paper employs the method of differential game and constructs three pollution control modes:The one where pollution is controlled by each country alone,the pollution compensation mode,and“who pollutes,who controls”mode.Then,this paper analyzes the continuous dynamic changes of pollution control decisions in two upstream and downstream countries,and obtains the equilibrium levels of the pollution discharge,pollution control and social welfare of the upstream and downstream countries under the three modes.The research shows that only when the unit pollution control cost due to technological progress is small and the loss of pollution is within a certain range,the mode of“who pollutes,who controls”can improve both pollution control and economic development.The pollution compensation mode is more favorable for the downstream country when the pollution loss is small,while the mode of controlling pollution alone is better when the pollution loss is large.The downstream country is better to choose the mode of“who pollutes,who controls”when the loss of pollution is within a certain range.