理由空间中的客观性何以可能?——布兰顿论概念规范的客观性

How is Objectivity Possible in the Space of Reasons?--Brandom on Objectivity of Conceptual Norms

概念内容如何指涉世界?概念内容的客观性如何得到保障 20世纪后半叶以来,以罗蒂为代表的新实用主义者从不同维度对传统真理观和客观性概念进行批判和消解。在新实用主义者看来,概念内容不是直接通过语词与世界的对应关系而是通过其在判断中所发挥的作用被赋予的,而判断本身在主体的认知系统中具有功能性作用。按照这种理解,这些概念所表述的内容与其所关涉的对象之间的关系问题就构成了一个开放的问题。文章阐明布兰顿对于概念规范的客观性思想的论述,分析布兰顿的概念规范客观性证明所面临的指责和困境,以及布兰顿如何对这些责难进行回应,最后指明在规范性哲学的视域下理由空间中的客观性何以可能。

How does conceptual content refer to the world?How is the objectivity of conceptual content guaranteed?Since the second half of the 20th century,the neo-pragmatists represented by Rorty have criticized and dispelled the traditional view of truth and the concept of objectivity from different dimensions.In the view of neo-pragmatists,the conceptual content that constitutes a thought or judgment is not given directly through the correspondence be⁃tween the word and the world but through the role it plays in the judgment,and the judgment itself has a functional role in the cognitive system of the subject.According to this understanding,the relationship between the contents expressed by these concepts and the objects they refer to constitutes an open question.This article exposits Bran⁃dom’s view about the objectivity of conceptual norms,analyzes the accusations and dilemmas faced by Brandom’s objectivity proof of conceptual norms as well as Brandom’s responses to these critiques,and finally points out how objectivity is possible in the space of reasons under the perspective of philosophy of normativity.