财政分权视角下的地方政府多维效用函数与环保支出偏好

Multidimensional Utility Function and Environmental Protection Expenditure of Local Government under“Fiscal Decentralization”

国内地方政府的环保支出偏好受制于特殊的财政分权架构,并会受到上级引导、同级竞争、本级财力等多重因素的制约,现有研究较少对财政分权架构下的地方政府的多维效用函数及由此引致的环保支出偏好特征展开讨论。为此,结合理论模型推导及涵盖2012—2019年247个地级市面板数据的实证检验,对财政分权架构下的地方政府环保支出的多元驱动机制作出诊断,结果发现:上级政策引导会激励地方政府的环保支出意愿,同级经济竞争和自身财力约束则会对其环保支出力度形成制约;多维约束间存在明显的交互效应,同级经济竞争与上级政策引导对地方政府的环保支出偏好存在显著反向对冲效应,而本级财力约束则会影响地方政府在上级引导与同级竞争压力间的权衡;本级财力约束会透过向上的财政依赖和内部财政支出腾挪两种不同的传导机制影响地方政府的环保支出偏好。因此,应构建兼容地方政府多维目标的综合方案,打造“考核竞争”的动态协同机制,设计适应地方财力约束的差异化路径,以有效解决地方政府环保支出激励问题。

Local governments’environmental spending preferences are derived from the fiscal decentralization structure in China,and therefore restricted by multiple factors such as superior guidance,competition at the same level,and own financial resources.However,the existing literatures rarely discuss the multi-dimensional utility function of local government under the framework of fiscal decentralization and the resulting characteristics on its environmental protection expenditure preference.Combined with theoretical model derivation and empirical test covering the panel data of 247 prefecture-level cities from 2012 to 2019,this paper makes an all-round diagnosis of the multiple driving mechanism of local government environmental protection expenditure under the framework of fiscal decentralization,and finds that:Superior policy guidance will encourage local governments to spend on environmental protection,but economic competition at the same level and their own financial constraints will restrict their environmental protection spending behavior;There is an obvious interaction effect between multi-dimensional constraints.Economic competition at the same level and policy guidance from the higher level have an obvious reverse hedging effect on local governments’environmental protection spending preferences,while own financial constraints will affect local governments’trade-offs between superior guidance and competitive pressure at the same level:Financial constraints of local governments will affect their environmental spending preferences through two different transmission mechanisms:upward fiscal dependence and internal fiscal expenditure shifting.Therefore,the construction of a comprehensive plan compatible with the multi-dimensional objectives of local governments,the creation of a dynamic collaborative mechanism of“examination and competition”,and the design of a differentiated path to adapt to local financial constraints are the key to effectively solve the problem of local government environmental protection spending incentives.