抵抗物理窃取的5G车联网匿名认证协议

Anonymous 5G VANETs authentication against physical theft

由于第五代(5G)移动通信技术具有高速、低延迟、广覆盖等特点,它被广泛应用于车载自组织网络(VANETs)中,以提高信息传输效率。然而,在车联网中,通信发生在高度开放的环境中,传输的信息容易被恶意攻击者篡改、截取、删除。因此,车联网通信的安全性需要得到保障,特别是信息的认证性和完整性方面。此外,车辆在通信过程中需要保护身份隐私,以避免恶意攻击者跟踪其行驶路线。与此同时,如果车辆存在恶意行为,可信权威需要能够追踪恶意车辆并揭露其真实身份。尽管群签名能够实现匿名性和可追踪性,但是其安全性依赖于一个强有力的假设,即密钥长期存储在设备上,并且不会被任何恶意攻击者访问。但实际上,攻击者可以通过类似侧信道攻击的物理攻击窃取存储在设备上的密钥,这极大地威胁了通信的安全性。为此,本研究提出了一种抵抗物理窃取的5G车联网匿名认证协议。该协议采用不可克隆函数构造一种新颖的群签名算法,用于车对车和车对基础设施的匿名认证。利用不可克隆函数的挑战响应对实时产生车辆的密钥,而不需要长期将密钥储存到车辆上,以避免恶意攻击者的物理窃取。此外,当发生纠纷时,可信权威可以通过签名追踪恶意车辆。最后,安全性分析表明,该协议满足抵抗物理窃取攻击、不可伪造性、匿名性、可追踪性、不可否认性、不可链接性等安全需求。而且,性能评估表明,与其他相关协议相比,该协议在计算开销和通信开销方面表现更优。

As the fifth-generation(5G)mobile communication technology features high speed,low latency,and wide coverage,it has been widely applied in vehicular ad hoc networks(VANETs)to improve information transmission efficiency.However,in the con-text of vehicular networks,communication occurs in a highly open environment,and transmitted information is susceptible to tam-pering,interception,and deletion by malicious attackers.Therefore,the security of vehicular communication needs to be ensured,es-pecially in terms of information authentication and integrity.In addition,vehicles need to protect their identity privacy during com-munication to avoid malicious attackers from tracking their driving routes.At the same time,if vehicles engage in malicious behav-ior,the Trusted Authority(TA)need to be able to track malicious vehicles and reveal their true identities.Although Group Signature(GS)can achieve anonymity and traceability,its security relies on a strong assumption that the secret key is stored on the device for a long time and is not accessible to any malicious attackers.However,in reality,attackers can steal the secret keys stored on devices through physical attacks similar to side-channel attacks,which greatly threatens communication security.To address this issue,this study proposes a anonymous authentication protocol resistant to physical theft for 5G VANETs.The protocol uses Physically Un-clonable Function(PUF)to construct a novel group signature algorithm for anonymous authentication between Vehicle-to-Vehicle(V2V)and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure(V2I).The Challenge-Response Pair(CRP)of PUF is used to generate keys for vehicles in real-time,without the need for long-term storage of keys on vehicles,in order to avoid physical theft by malicious attackers.In addition,when disputes arise,the TA can track malicious vehicles through signatures.Finally,security analysis shows that the protocol meets security requirements such as resistance to physical theft attacks,unforgeability,anonymity,traceability,non-repudiation,and un-linkability.Furthermore,performance evaluation shows that compared with other relevant protocols,this protocol performs better in terms of computational and communication costs.