高管薪酬结构与企业创新——基于高管风险承担视角

Executive Compensation Structure and Corporate Innovation—An Executive Risk-Taking Perspective

创新是企业获得技术优势的重要行为,有助于国家实现高水平科技自立自强,高管是企业做出创新决策的主体。以2008—2021年中国沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,对高管薪酬结构影响企业创新的效应及作用机制进行了实证检验。研究发现,随着高管薪酬结构中股权薪酬比例的提升,企业创新投入水平呈先上升后下降的倒“U”型趋势。进一步地,以激励物的Delta指数和Vega指数为度量的高管风险承担在薪酬结构影响企业创新的路径中发挥了中介作用。异质性分析表明,高管股权薪酬对企业创新的正向激励效果仅显著存在于非国有企业和位于高市场化程度地区的企业当中。因此,企业要制定合理的薪酬结构,适当提高股权薪酬占比,并注重改善激励环境提升高管的风险承担能力,为企业创新创造良好的内外部环境。

Innovation is crucial for enterprises to gain technological advantages and assists countries in achieving great self-reliance and strength in science and technology.Executives play a pivotal role in making innovation decisions.Using A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2021 as samples,this study empirically examines the effect of executive compensation structure on corporate innovation and the underlying mechanism.The findings indicate that as the proportion of equity compensation in the executive compensation structure increases,the level of corporate innovation investment follows an inverted U-shaped trend of increasing first and then decreasing.Furthermore,executive risk-taking factors measured by the Delta index and Vega index of incentives play a mediating role between executive compensation structure and corporate innovation.Heterogeneity analysis shows that the positive incentive effect of executive equity compensation on corporate innovation is significant in non-state-owned enterprises and enterprises located in regions with high levels of marketization.Therefore,enterprises should establish reasonable compensation structures,appropriately increase the proportion of equity compensation,and focus on improving the incentive environment to enhance executives risk-taking ability,thus creating a favorable internal and external environment for corporate innovation.