国企混改与独立董事异议行为

Mixed-Ownership Reform and Dissenting Behavior of Independent Directors

本文以2004~2020年A股国有上市公司为样本,探究了国有企业混合所有制改革对独立董事异议行为的影响,并进一步考察了市场化水平的调节作用。研究发现,国有企业混合所有制改革的程度与独立董事出具异议意见的概率和数量显著正相关,即混合所有制改革加强了国有企业独立董事的监督作用;在市场化水平较低的地区,混合所有制改革对独立董事异议行为的影响更大。经过一系列稳健性检验后,上述研究结论依然成立。进一步研究表明,混合所有制改革与独立董事异议行为之间的正相关关系仅在地方国企和竞争程度较高的国企中显著。本文结论为进一步深化国企改革提供了经验证据和有益借鉴。

Using a sample of Chinese listed firms during the period of 2004-2020,this study examines the influence of mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises on independent directors'dissenting behaviors and further investigates the moderating effects of marketization.Our findings reveal that the degree of mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises is significantly positively associated with the likelihood and the number of dissenting opinions of independent directors,suggesting that mixed-ownership reform improves the monitoring role of independent directors.Moreover,the influence of mixed-ownership reform on dissenting behavior of independent directors is more pronounced for firms located in regions with lower marketization levels than those located in regions with higher marketization levels.Our findings are robust to a series of sensitivity tests.Finally,this study further finds that the positive association between mixed-ownership reform and dissenting behavior of independent directors only exists in stateowned enterprises controlled by local governments and in competitive industries.This study provides empirical evidence and useful reference for further deepening reform of state-owned enterprises.