基于权力激励调节视角的民营上市企业高管激励研究

Research on Executive Incentives in Private Listed Companies Based on the Perspective of Power Incentive Regulation

如何通过有效的高管激励机制使民营上市公司的股东权益得到保障,是民营企业发展过程中的核心问题。以2003—2019年沪深两市民营企业为样本,引入权力激励(高管是否兼任董事长)和经济激励(薪酬和股权激励)手段作为影响高管激励的因素,探讨如何建立更适合我国民营上市公司的高管激励机制。研究表明:薪酬激励和股权激励与股东权益之间存在倒U形关系;权力激励与薪酬激励之间存在互补作用;权力激励与股权激励之间存在替代作用,而且这种替代作用会随着时间的推移而减弱。

How to safeguard the shareholders’ equity of private listed companies through effective executive incentive mechanisms is a core issue in the development of private enterprises. Taking private enterprises listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2003 to 2019 as samples, this study introduces power incentives (whether executives concurrently serve as chairman) and economic incentives (compensation and equity incentives) as factors influencing executive incentives and explores how to establish executive incentive mechanisms more suitable for private listed companies in China. The research shows that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between compensation incentives, equity incentives, and shareholders’ equity;there is a complementary relationship between power incentives and compensation incentives;there is a substitutive relationship between power incentives and equity incentives, and this substitutive effect weakens over time.