我国反垄断私人诉讼激励制度的建构——基于636起案件的实证分析

Constructing an Incentive Mechanism for Private Anti-Monopoly Litigation in China:An Empirical Analysis Based on 636 Cases

反垄断私人诉讼作为私主体权益救济的有效途径,能够有效弥补公共实施的不足,实现对受害者的直接救济,并对垄断经营者形成威慑。通过对我国《反垄断法》实施以来受害者主动提起的636起民事诉讼案件进行实证分析发现,目前我国反垄断私人诉讼的实施存在案件总体数量少、案件类型单一、案件胜诉率低、原告诉讼净收益低、群体性诉讼不规范的问题。因此,有必要从法经济学的角度分析解决。通过采用“选择退出”式集体诉讼、增加酌定惩罚性赔偿、进一步减轻原告举证责任的方式重新塑造我国反垄断私人诉讼激励路径,能够有效降低潜在原告的支出成本,提高诉讼收益和胜诉概率。

Private anti-monopoly litigation,as an effective way to safeguard the rights and interests of private entities,can make up for the deficiencies of public enforcement,provide remedies for victims,and deter monopolistic conductors.However,through an empirical analysis of 636 civil litigation cases initiated by victims since the implementation of China's Anti-Monopoly Law,it is found that private antitrust enforcement in China faces challenges such as a low caseloads,limited case types,low success rate,low net earnings for plaintiffs,and lack of standardization in group litigation.Therefore,it is necessary to examine and address these issues from the perspective of law and economics.By adopting an opt-out collective litigation,introducing discretionary punitive damages,and further reducing the burden of proof on plaintiffs,China's path for incentivizing private antitrust enforcement would be reshaped.As a result,plaintiffs'expected costs would reduce,while rising their expected benefits and chance of Success.