社保费征管、市场势力与企业负担——基于社保移交税务征管的研究

Collection of Social Insurance Contributions,Market Power and the Burden on Enterprises:Research on Tax Authorities Taking Full Responsibility for Collecting Social Insurance Contributions

加强社保费征管是促进社保基金可持续的重要手段,但也会提高企业的用工成本,压缩盈利空间。本文通过构建理论模型,讨论了加强社保费征管的经济归宿,分析得出在社保费征管变严格后,劳动密集型企业、产品市场势力小和劳动力市场势力小的企业的盈利空间有更大幅度的下降。企业预期利润的下降,将及时反映到股价的下降上。2018年的《国税地税征管体制改革方案》规定社保费征管移交税务部门。本文通过事件研究法,分析了改革方案出台对企业股价的影响。实证研究表明,劳动密集型企业、低社保缴纳遵从度企业、产品市场势力小和劳动力市场势力小的企业,在改革信息发布后市场价值下跌更为明显,表明社保费实际缴费率上升,将在更大程度上压缩这些企业的盈利空间。本文提供了社保征收体制改革对企业影响的理论机制和经验证据,对今后进一步完善配套政策、减轻企业负担、保护市场主体具有重要意义。

Social security is a safety net for people’s livelihoods and a stabilizer for society.The Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China clearly puts forward the need to improve a multi-level social security system that is fair,uniform,sustainable and covers the entire population in both urban and rural areas.In recent years,with the aging of the population,the social security funds are faced with increasing pressure.Strengthening the collection and management of social insurance contributions will undoubtedly promote the sustainability of social security.In this context,on July 20,2018,the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council issued the Reform Program of the State Tax and Local Tax Collection and Management System,proposing that from January 1,2019 onward,the social insurance contributions will be collected by the tax authorities.A comprehensive assessment of the benefits and costs of the Reform Program is of great significance.On the one hand,the reform will change the previous collection method of social insurance contributions,prompting enterprises to pay social insurance contributions in a truthful and compliant manner,improving the efficiency and lowering the cost of collection,expanding social security coverage,and promoting the establishment of a sustainable social security system.On the other hand,however,the increased intensity of collection will raise the de facto burden of enterprises in paying social insurance contributions and their labor costs,and squeeze their profit margins.The sustainable development of social security requires not only a higher quality of collection,but also sustained economic growth and higher incomes for laborers.In view of this,the standardization of the collection and management of social insurance contributions should be coordinated with the protection of market players and the stabilization of the economy.In order to answer the question of to what extent the actual rate increase induced by the reform will affect the profits of enterprises in China,and to clarify the economic costs of the reform,in this paper,we first constructed a theoretical model,analyzed the impacts of the reform on the enterprises,and deduced that the ultimate burden is shared among the laborers,the enterprises,and the consumers.Further heterogeneity analysis shows that labor-intensive firms,firms with less market power,and firms with poorer compliance in paying social insurance contributions will face a heavier burden.The theoretical hypotheses are empirically verified through the event study method using daily stock price data of A-share companies.The event study method removes the normal returns estimated from the actual returns of the sample stocks assuming that the Reform Program was not released,and obtains the abnormal returns that measure the extent to which the stock price reacts to the occurrence of the event,so that it can strip away the disturbing factors and reflect the impact of the reform on the market value of the enterprises and their profits.Specifically,this paper finds that during the[0,1]two-day window when the Reform Program was released,(1)The cumulative excess returns of high labor-intensive firms declined significantly compared to low labor-intensive firms;(2)compared to firms with high product market power,firms with low product market power saw their cumulative excess returns fall significantly after the reform;(3)the cumulative excess returns of firms with small labor market power declined significantly compared to firms with large labor market power;(4)firms with poor payment compliance before the reform experienced a greater decline in their market value after the reform.These results suggest that giving tax authorities full charge of social insurance contributions collection will increase the actual rate of social insurance premiums,leading to a decrease in market value and the profit margins of highly labor-intensive firms and firms with less market power.The findings of this paper show that the strict collection of social insurance contributions has increased the burden on enterprises and had negative impact on their profits.This shows that in the context of stabilizing growth and employment,the strict collection of social insurance contributions cannot be achieved overnight,but should be promoted steadily while protecting the production and operation of enterprises.While the government regulates social security collections,it is necessary to reduce taxes and fees to alleviate the pressure of increased business costs.It is also necessary to defer the payment of some taxes and fees,increase credit support and adopt other policies to support enterprises with weaker market power through the transition period,to stabilize market expectations and protect market players.