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双重身份属性下双边平台“二选一”行为的反垄断规制 被引量:2

Antitrust Regulations on the“Choose One out of the Two”Behavior of Bilateral Platforms under the Dual Identity Attribute
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摘要 双边平台“二选一”行为对市场竞争的损害普遍存在,但其反垄断规制却一直效果欠佳,归根结底是忽视了双边平台与线上交易市场相互融合所产生的理论与实践上相关竞争失序、权益失衡的消极影响。双边平台不仅为平台企业提供线上交易服务内容,还是商家线上经营与竞争的虚拟市场空间,由此平台企业同时具有了服务者与市场管理者的双重身份。加之,平台因不能互联互通而具有独立性,高昂的转移成本产生了平台企业较强的锁定能力,多渠道模式则进一步削弱了平台企业间的可替代性,由此加强了平台企业的市场优势力量。因此,双边平台的“二选一”行为与传统排他性交易行为有着显著区别,具有更直接且更严重的排除或限制竞争效果,在双边平台“二选一”行为的规制过程中,既要解决反垄断法的适用难题,高效作出反垄断法规制模式的选择,亦要在此基础上,对传统排他性交易和反垄断规制理论的适用进行适当的解释、创新和突破,最终实现在消费者权益保护、双边平台及其平台经营者之间的利益平衡,规范平台企业经济主体的竞争规则,促进双边平台公正自由的竞争秩序。 The harm of the“Choose One out of the Two”behavior of bilateral platform enterprises to market competition is widespread,but their antitrust regulations have always been ineffective.Ultimately,it is due to the neglect of the negative impact of the integration of bilateral platforms and online trading markets on theoretical and practical aspects of competition disorder and equity imbalance.Bilateral platforms are not only online trading services provided by platform enterprises,but also virtual market spaces for merchants to operate and compete online.In fact,platform enterprises have dual identities as market service providers and market managers.In addition,platform enterprises have independence due to their lack of interconnection and high transfer costs,resulting in strong locking capabilities.The multi-channel model further weakens the substitutability between platform enterprises,thereby strengthening their market advantages.From the perspective of power attributes,the market management rights of platform enterprises stem from the aggregation of individual service contracts between the platform and a large number of merchants and consumers.The management behavior of platform enterprises with private law attributes poses a risk of abuse,and the“Choose One out of the Two”behavior of bilateral platform enterprises is significantly different from traditional exclusive trading behavior,which has a more direct and serious effect of excluding or restricting competition.However,due to the lack of systematic coordination and planning in the legislation of market regulations in China,the antitrust law and other market economy laws have not formed a clear legal order within the market regulation legal system,with clear hierarchy between upper and lower laws and mutual coordination between the same law.The problem of chaotic legal application is common in practice.In the long run,in the process of regulating the“Choose One out of the Two”behavior of bilateral platform enterprises,it is necessary to not only solve the application difficulties of the antitrust law and make efficient choices of antitrust regulation modes,but also appropriately explain,innovate,and break through the application of traditional exclusive trading and antitrust regulation theories,ultimately achieving consumer rights protection,balancing the interests of bilateral platform enterprises and their platform operators,standardizing the competition rules of the economic entities of platform enterprises,and promoting a fair and free competition order for bilateral platform enterprises.
作者 丁国峰 Ding Guofeng(School of Law,Anhui University,Anhui Hefei 230601,China)
机构地区 安徽大学法学院
出处 《上海财经大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》 北大核心 2024年第1期33-47,共15页 Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
基金 国家社会科学基金一般项目“数字经济时代大数据市场限制竞争行为法律规制研究”(20BFX149)。
关键词 双重身份 双边平台 二选一 管理行为 滥用市场支配地位 dual identities bilateral platforms “Choose One out of the Two"' management behavior abuse of market dominance
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