“偏离”假设视角下中国政府的体制机制创新——兼论政府职责体系的优化

The Institutional Mechanism Innovation of the Chinese Governmentfrom the Perspective of the“Deviation”Hypothesis

政府创新是政府发展研究的重要议题之一。相较于从制度变迁理论的新旧体制转换视角对政府创新做出的经典解释,政府过程理论的“偏离”假设,为从政府在现实与法理的“摆动”中寻求体制机制创新的解释提供可能,丰富了其存在的理论必然性与现实必要性。现实政府往往在适度、过度以及多重“偏离”所形成的合力中实现发展。但从制度的“路径依赖”看,法律和现存制度并不具有使那种正向“偏离”合法化的积极性和主动性。要想将其——至少是高效地将其纳入现有的法律和制度,需要进行有目的性的政府干预。而体制机制创新正是最为典型的干预手段之一。中国政府职责体系的优化路径,能够典型地反映清单制度作为体制机制创新对“偏离”现象发挥的关键作用,揭示其功能实现的基本逻辑。这对于政府创新研究具有突破性意义。

Government innovation is one of the important topics in government development research.Compared to the classic explanation of government innovation from the perspective of institutional change theory’s transition from old to new systems,the“deviation”hypothesis of government process theory provides the possibility to seek explanations for institutional mechanism innovation from the“swing”of reality and legal theory,enriching its theoretical inevitability and practical necessity.Realistic governments often achieve development through the combined forces of moderation,excess,and multiple“deviations”.But from the perspective of the“path dependence”of the system,the law and existing systems do not have the enthusiasm and initiative to legalize the positive“deviation”.To incorporate it–at least efficiently–into existing laws and systems,targeted government intervention is necessary.As such,institutional mechanism innovation is one of the most typical intervention methods.The optimization path of the Chinese government’s responsibility system can typically reflect the key role of the inventory system as an institutional mechanism innovation in addressing the phenomenon of“deviation”,and reveal the basic logic of its functional implementation.This has groundbreaking significance for government innovation research.