多个平台排他性交易的理论与反垄断分析

Theoretical and antitrust analysis of exclusive dealing with multiple platforms

基于存在多个竞争性平台的理论框架,研究了平台的两种排他性合约形式:传统排他性合约和“二选一”合约.区分了优势平台使用这两种排他性合约动机的差异,并分析了不同形式的排他性合约对市场竞争和市场各方参与者收益的影响.研究结果表明,平台之间以及卖家之间的差异化程度是决定优势平台提供不同形式排他性合约的动机以及排他性交易对市场参与者产生的影响的核心因素.当平台之间以及卖家之间的差异化程度均较小时,优势平台选择提供传统排他性合约;而卖家之间的差异化程度较大时,优势平台选择提供“二选一”合约.尽管不同形式的排他性交易均会降低消费者剩余和总福利水平,但对其他竞争平台和卖家利润的影响是不确定的.传统排他性合约可以同时降低多个竞争平台的利润,而“二选一”合约则可以同时降低多个卖家的利润.本研究为平台不同形式的排他性交易行为提供了理论解释.

Based on the theoretical framework of multiple competing platforms,two forms of exclusive contracts are investigated:Traditional exclusive contracts and“pick one of two”contracts.We distinguish the differences in the incentives of the dominant platform to use these contracts,and analyze the impact of the different forms of exclusive contracts on market competition and the revenues of market participants.Our study shows that the degree of differentiation between platforms and between sellers are the core factors in determining the incentives for the dominant platform to use different forms of exclusive contracts and the impact on market participants.When the degree of differentiation between platforms and between sellers are both small,the dominant platform uses traditional exclusive contracts,while when the degree of differentiation between sellers is large,the dominant platform uses“pick one of two”contracts.Although both exclusive dealings reduce consumer surplus and social welfare,the impact on profits of other competing platforms and sellers is uncertain.Traditional exclusive contracts can reduce the profits of all competing platforms,whereas“pick one of two”contracts can reduce the profits of all sellers.This study provides a theoretical explanation for the use of different forms of exclusive dealing of platforms.