维特根斯坦语言哲学观照下的机器智能

Machine Intelligence From Perspective of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Language

在维特根斯坦语言哲学视域下,机器被定义为缺乏面相知觉能力的“面相盲人”和不具有意向性的“意义盲人”,由于机器无法具身化的参与到“语言游戏”中因而不存在思维。维特根斯坦强调机器只是在遵守一种机械式的程序,非语境化的机器智能只有回归了语言的实践才能够消解“遵守规则”这一悖论。同时机器翻译在“语言游戏”中也面临着语义困境,只有实现人工智能语境化的语义识别才能消除句法与语义的内生对立,解决语义歧义,输出带有自然属性的语义内容。维氏的语言哲学思想对指导具身机器智能科学的发展路径以及机器翻译机制的迭代方向有重要的认识论意义。

In the perspective of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language,machines are defined as“aspect-blind”beings lacking aspect-perception abilities,and as“meaning-blind”beings lacking intentionality.Since machines are unable to embody themselves and actively participate in“language-games”,they are incapable of thinking.Wittgenstein emphasizes that machines are merely executing a mechanical procedures,and non-contextual machine intelligence can only realize solution of the paradox of“rule-following”through a return to the practice of language.Meanwhile,machine translation also faces semantic challenges in“language-games”.Only by realizing AI-contextualized semantic recognition can the inherent opposition between syntax and semantics be eliminated,semantic ambiguities resolved,and semantic content with natural attributes generated as output.Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language has significant epistemological implications for guiding the development trajectory of embodied artificial intelligence and the iterative direction of machine translation mechanisms.