摘要
自媒体过度使用个性化推荐技术,桎梏了信息的自由流动,降低信息流转效率,导致公众受困于信息茧房,而相关部门规制不严、惩罚力度不够、公众投诉失效等加剧了这一现象。文章构建政府、自媒体和公众之间的三方演化博弈模型,系统分析政府规制下各方的策略选择过程,通过MATLAB仿真分析不同政策的规制效果,并讨论各关键性要素变化对三方策略选择的影响。研究结果表明:信息规制需要政府投入成本建立有效的规制措施;政府通过加大惩罚额等规制措施可有效提升自媒体合规运营概率,对达到演化稳定状态具有极大影响,并保障演化稳定下的信息自由流通;自媒体合规运营产生的收益影响其合规运营意愿;约束并规范自媒体行为,营造全面异质信息环境,可有效防范公众陷入信息茧房。
The concept of an“information cocoon”,also known as the echo chamber effect or information echo,refers to a phenomenon where prolonged exposure to homogenous information types prevents the reception of diverse viewpoints,thereby leading to the solidification of information pathways.This situation is akin to living within a self-contained cocoon.In pursuit of traffic and other gains,we-media platforms collect behavioral data from the public to identify their interests and hobbies.These platforms employ algorithmic filtering mechanisms that often exclude valuable information unaligned with public interest,perpetuating the circulation of outdated and uniform content.This practice hinders the free flow of information,diminishes the efficiency of information dissemination,and entraps the public within an information cocoon.Moreover,the dynamic nature of public interests and preferences,which evolve over time,is not adequately addressed by we-media’s information distribution strategies.This results in a low differential in information potential,manifesting adverse effects.The competitive landscape among we-media platforms,driven by mutual interest,has escalated into a societal concern,impeding the efficient circulation of information.The societal need to address the information cocoon is urgent.Additionally,the leniency in relevant departmental regulations,lack of substantial penalties,and ineffective public grievance mechanisms further exacerbate this phenomenon.The interplay of internet technology,algorithmic filtering,and we-media platforms has increasingly highlighted the information cocoon as a significant social issue,affecting the efficient flow of information.In this era of advanced social media,it is crucial to resolve the information cocoon dilemma resulting from the information dissemination process of we-media.It necessitates strengthening governmental regulation in the information domain.Hence,this paper proposes to construct a game-theoretic model involving the government,we-media,and the public.This model analyzes the decision-making behaviors of these actors and their impact on stakeholders,aiming to identify an optimal systemic strategy.This approach serves as a theoretical reference for government interventions in managing the we-media information cocoon and fosters enhanced governance in social networks.The paper focuses on three primary questions:(1)What effective regulatory actions should government authorities implement to oversee we-media’s decision-making?(2)How can we-media refine their information distribution methods to mitigate the information cocoon effect and guide public cognition in a structured and scientific manner?(3)Given an understanding of the causes behind the information cocoon,how can the public be effectively directed to circumvent it?This study methodically analyzes the strategic choices of each party under governmental oversight,using MATLAB simulations to examine the effects of various regulatory policies and exploring how key factor variations influence the strategies of the three entities involved.The goal is to discover the most effective strategy for managing the we-media information cocoon.The findings indicate that effective information regulation necessitates government investment in establishing robust regulatory measures.By augmenting penalties and other regulatory interventions,governments can significantly enhance the likelihood of we-media adhering to regulations,which is crucial for achieving evolutionary stability and ensuring the free flow of information within this context.The compliance behavior of we-media is influenced by the revenue generated from such adherence.Thus,curbing and standardizing we-media behavior and fostering a diverse information environment can effectively prevent the public from becoming ensnared in the information cocoon.Regulating the we-media information cocoon is a complex task,involving multiple stakeholders.This study does not delve deeply into the specific characteristics of we-media violations across different platforms.Future research will conduct a more thorough analysis based on emblematic cases of the information cocoon phenomenon.
作者
谢荣见
刘冬菊
贾玉财
XIE Rongjian;LIU Dongju;JIA Yucai(Business School,Nanjing University of Information Science&Technology,Nanjing 210044,China;School of Management Engineering,Anhui Polytechnic University,Wuhu 241000,China)
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSCD
北大核心
2024年第2期130-136,共7页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71701002)
国家社会科学基金资助项目(16BGL201)。
关键词
政府规制
自媒体
信息茧房
公众认知行为
三方演化博弈
government regulation
we-media
information cocoons
the public’s cognitive behavior
tripartite evolutionary game