双重股东派生诉讼的理据重述

Restatement of the Institutional Rationale for Double Derivative Actions of Shareholders

保护少数股东是公司治理的核心任务之一,以单一制公司为规制对象的传统公司法上,股东派生诉讼是少数股东对抗多数股东压制、防止管理层专断的有力武器。但现实是,企业集团复杂的控制关系和层级结构超出了股东派生诉讼的规制范围,母公司少数股东频现因子公司受损而遭受损害却无法救济的窘境。在此背景下,引入双重派生诉讼以补缺公司法,已成为优先选项。双重派生诉讼的制度理据向有争议,需要系统的理论反思,以拓宽现有规范的理论视域,挖掘其制度潜力。具体可以从股东权缩减与股东权穿越的双重视角证立双重派生诉讼的必要性、正当性,借此强化中小投资者利益保护、优化营商环境的理论体系。

The protection of minority shareholders is one of the core tasks of corporate governance.In traditional corporate law,which takes unitary corporation as the object of regulation,the shareholders’derivative action system is a powerful weapon for minority shareholders to fight against the suppression of majority shareholders and prevent the management from arbitrariness.However,the reality is that the complex control relationship and hierarchical structure of enterprise groups exceeds the scope of shareholders’derivative actions,the minority shareholders of the parent company frequently suffer from the dilemma of not being able to remedy the damage caused by the subsidiary company.In this context,the introducing double derivative action system to complement corporate law has become a priority option.The institutional rationale for double derivative action system has been controversial,and requires systematic theoretical reflection to broaden the theoretical horizon of the existing regulations and explore its institutional potential.Specifically,the necessity and legitimacy of the double derivative action system can be justified from the dual perspective of the reduction of shareholders’rights and the cross of shareholders’rights,whereby the protection of the interests of small and medium-sized investors can be enhanced and the theoretical system of the business environment can be optimized.