政府补助、高管超额薪酬与审计费用

Government Subsidy,Senior Executives' Overpayment and Audit Fees

政府补助作为公司的一种非经常性损益,在给公司带来积极效果的同时容易引致管理层产生投机心态进而发生寻租行为和增加代理成本,并最终产生利用政府补助粉饰业绩的事实。因此,对政府补助进行审计已成为上市公司审计中重点关注的问题。利用2012—2020年沪深两市A股上市公司的微观数据实证研究政府补助、高管超额薪酬与审计费用之间的关系。结果发现,政府补助显著提升公司的审计费用,并且高管超额薪酬发挥着部分中介作用;进一步分析发现,政府补助与审计费用之间的正相关关系在国有控股、公司治理较差以及东部地区的公司中更明显。研究结论丰富了政府补助经济后果的研究内容,并从政府的角度拓宽了审计定价影响因素研究,为进一步完善财政资源分配和优化公司治理结构提供了理论依据和经验支撑。

As the non-recurring profit and loss of listed companies,the government subsidy can bring positive effects,and it can also easily cause the management's speculative mentality which may lead to rent-seeking behaviors and increase agency costs,and finally do produce the fact that the government subsidy is used to whitewash the performance.Therefore,auditing the government subsidy has become a key issue in the field of listed companies' auditing.This paper employs micro-data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2012 to 2020 to empirically study the relationship among government subsidy,senior executives' overpayment and audit fees.The results show that the government subsidy can significantly increase the company's audit fees,and senior executives' overpayment plays a mediating role to a certain extent;the further analysis shows that the positive relationship between government subsidy and audit fees is more pronounced in those companies that are state-owned,with poor corporate governance,and in the eastern areas.Conclusions of this paper not only enrich the research content of the economic consequences of the government subsidy,but also broaden the research on the influencing factors of audit pricing from the perspective of the government,and provide theoretical basis and empirical support for further improving the allocation of financial resources and optimizing the corporate governance structure.