摘要
We introduce a model of a market where risk-averse consumers pay a fee to transfer their future losses to one or more firms.The future loss of each consumer is stochastic with a unique,known mean and variance.The law of large numbers allows the firms to know with certainty the expected aggregate loss of the consumers to whom they sell.The model could describe the behavior of agents in the market for property insurance where an insurance company sells a single type of policy to a specific group of consumers based upon the expected losses of those consumers and their willingness to pay for coverage.The model demonstrates how a single firm can choose the optimal segment of the market to which they sell a policy and how that choice might change when the distribution of consumers and their risk aversion changes.The model also demonstrates how two firms might engage in a cooperative strategy and share the market.The model shows how a firm entering the market will find it more advantageous to target a segment of the market with consumers that have a lower expected loss.
