摘要
鼓励公众参与是赋能银行监管的重要途径。本文将银行监管领域中的公众参与区分为公众监督监管行为(公众监督)和公众举报违法行为(公众投诉),并使用2SLS-IV回归法,探讨了两类公众参与在银行监管中的作用。研究结果表明,两类公众参与均有助于降低银行风险,但其发挥作用的渠道机制存在差异。具体而言,公众监督通过提升监管执法规范来降低银行风险,而公众投诉则通过加强监管执法力度来降低银行风险。进一步的分析发现,反腐败强度越大,公众监督的影响效应越强;银行资产规模越小,公众投诉的影响效应越强。根据以上结论,本文建议银行监管改革在注重监管机构“从上而下”治理思路的同时,还应重视公众参与“自下而上”的作用。
Encouraging public participation is a crucial way in empowering banking supervision.This paper distinguishes public participation in the field of banking supervision into public supervision of supervisory authorities(public oversight)and public reporting of unlawful activities of banks(public complaints).Utilizing the 2SLS-IV method,it explores the roles of these two forms of public participation in banking supervision.The results indicate that both forms of public participation contribute to reducing banking risks,but they operate through different channels.Specifically,public oversight primarily reduces banking risks by enhancing supervisory enforcement norms,while public complaints lower banking risks by intensifying supervisory enforcement efforts.Further analysis reveals that the greater the intensity of anti-corruption,the stronger the impact of public oversight,and the smaller the size of bank assets,the stronger the impact of public complaints.Based on these findings,this paper suggests that in addition to emphasizing the"top-down"governance approach of supervisory authorities,banking supervisory reforms should also prioritize the"bottom-up"role of public participation.
作者
程军国
何婧
CHENG Junguo;HE Jing
出处
《金融监管研究》
北大核心
2024年第1期42-60,共19页
Financial Regulation Research
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目“数字普惠金融支持乡村振兴的政策与实践研究”(22&ZD123)
国家自然科学基金面上项目“金融监管地方化对农村金融资源配置效率的影响机理及其监管研究”(71973135)
中国农业大学研究生自主创新项目“银行监管者激励约束机制的风险治理效应研究”的资助。
关键词
公众参与
公众监督
公众投诉
银行监管
银行风险
Public Participation
Public Oversight
Public Complaints
Bank Supervisory
Bank Risk