业绩承诺变更会影响企业研发费用操纵吗?

Does Performance Commitment Change Affect R&D Manipulation?

以2011-2022年A股并购业绩承诺事件为研究对象,探讨了业绩承诺变更对研发费用操纵的影响。研究发现:业绩承诺变更加剧了上市公司研发费用操纵现象,且这一影响是通过激发高管机会主义、降低商业信用融资能力实现的;异质性检验发现,业绩承诺变更对研发费用操纵的影响在关联并购事件、主并方为国有企业、以及分析师关注程度较低的企业中更为显著;动机和经济后果检验发现,业绩承诺变更主要通过激发高管的政策迎合动机提高了研发费用操纵水平,而该行为使得企业获取了更多的税收优惠和政府补助。

Taking the A-share M&A performance commitment events from 2011 to 2022 as the research object,This paper examines the impact of performance commitment changes on the R&D manipulation.The study finds that changes in performance promises increase firms’R&D manipulation and that this effect is achieved by increasing executive opportunism and reducing commercial credit financing;The heterogeneity test finds that the effect of performance commitment change on R&D manipulation is more significant among firms with connected M&A events,state-owned firms,and firms with less analyst attention;Motivation and economic consequences tests find that performance commitment changes increase R&D manipulation more by motivating executives’policy pandering motives,and that the behavior does allow firms to obtain more tax incentives and government grants.