外包环境下合同制造商入侵与供应商发展

Contract Manufacturer Encroachment and Supplier Development in Outsourcing

针对外包环境中由合同制造商(CM)和原始设备制造商(OEM)构成的供应链,本文研究作为供应商的CM的市场入侵决策与OEM的供应商发展决策之间的互动。本文构建供应链博弈模型,运用逆向归纳法解得均衡。研究表明:(1)当OEM投资效率较高时,供应商发展策略是阻止CM入侵的有效方式;(2)不论CM是否入侵,OEM的供应商发展策略都能提升自身以及CM的利润;(3)合同制造商入侵和供应商发展决策对上下游利润的影响可能相互促进也可能相互抵消;(4)当产品替代率和OEM投资效率都较低时,供应商发展和合同制造商入侵的同时存在能为CM和OEM带来双赢。

Considering a supply chain consisting of one contract manufacturer(CM) and one original equipment manufacturer(OEM) with production outsourcing, this research studies the interaction between the CM's encroachment decision and the OEM's supplier development decision. This study builds game-theoretic models and derives equilibrium results by backward induction. This study shows:(1) when the efficiency of OEM's supplier development investment is relatively high, supplier development is an effective way to prevent contract manufacturer encroachment;(2) supplier development improves the profits of the CM and OEM regardless of the CM's encroachment decision;(3) the impacts of contract manufacturer encroachment decision and supplier development decision on profits could be either strengthened or neutralized;(4) when the substitution rate between products and the OEM's investment efficiency are low, the contract manufacturer encroachment and supplier development may achieve a win-win outcome for the CM and OEM.