经营投资问责与国有企业风险防范--基于股价崩盘风险视角的实证研究

The Accountability System for Operation and Investment and State-Owned Enterprises Risks Prevention:An Empirical Study from the Perspective of Stock Price Crash Risk

以股价崩盘风险为研究视角,采用交错双重差分模型考察经营投资问责制度对国有企业风险防范的影响。研究结果表明,经营投资问责制度实施之后,国有企业的股价崩盘风险显著降低,而提高投资决策稳健性、降低代理成本和改善信息不透明度是经营投资问责制度发挥作用的重要机制。拓展性研究发现,经营投资问责对股价崩盘风险的抑制作用在高管激励更强、法治环境更好和行政层级更高的企业中更明显。进一步的经济后果分析发现,经营投资问责缓解股价崩盘风险后显著提升了国有资本保值增值率。研究结论不仅为经营投资问责制度的有效性提供了新的证据,还为健全国有企业问责体系、防范化解金融风险提供了重要的政策启示。

Based on the perspective of firms stock price crash risk,we adopt the staggered DID model to empirically test the impact of the OIA on the risks prevention of SOEs.The results find that after the implementation of the OIA,the stock price crash risk of SOEs is significantly reduced,while improving the robustness of investment decisions,reducing agency costs and improving information opacity are the major mechanisms.Extended research finds that the mitigating effect of OIA on the stock price crash risk is more pronounced in those SOEs with stronger executive incentives,better legal environment,and higher administrative hierarchies.Further analysis of the economic consequences shows that OIA significantly increases the value-added ratio of state-owned capital after mitigating the stock price crash risk.This paper not only provides new evidence for the effectiveness of the OIA,but also provides important policy insights for the improvement of the accountability system of SOEs with Chinese characteristics,and for the prevention and resolution of financial risks.