摘要
大部分高价值数据同时构成企业的商业秘密,使企业不愿在公开市场交易中直接披露,信息披露问题成为数据交易流通的阻滞因素。数据产权登记绕开数据内容的直接披露,通过间接传递关于数据质量的信息以促进数据交易流通。但是,这种间接披露路径对数据交易流通的促进效果尚待考证。信号理论为数据产权登记的制度评估提供了分析框架。数据产权登记可以被视为一种信号,其有效性通过调节信号成本实现。“登记机关形式审查”模式难以建构有效信号,宜在“登记机关形式审查+第三方实质审查”模式基础上进行制度完善。数据产权登记的制度完善需要以第三方实质审查为基础,以提高信号成本为核心,明确数据产权登记的客体要件、完善第三方服务机构的欺诈责任体系。
Most of high-value data also constitute the trade secrets of companies,making companies unwilling to disclose the data directly in public market.This information disclosure dilemma has become a bottleneck in data trading and circulation.Data property registration circumvents direct disclosure of data content and promotes data trading and circulation by indirectly conveying information about data quality.However,the efficacy of this indirect disclosure path in promoting data trading remains to be verified.Signaling theory provides an analytical framework for evaluating the institutional assessment of data property registration.Data property registration can be seen as a signal,whose effectiveness is achieved by adjusting signal costs.Currently,the"registration agency formal review"model is difficult to construct effective signals,and it is advisable to improve the system based on the"registration agency formal review+third-party substantive review"model.The institutional improvement of data property registration needs to be based on third-party substantive review,with the core of increasing signal costs,clarifying the object requirements of data property registration,and improving the fraud liability system of third-party service providers.
出处
《知识产权》
北大核心
2024年第3期54-72,共19页
Intellectual Property
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目“创新驱动发展战略下知识产权公共领域问题研究”(17ZDA139)阶段性研究成果。
关键词
数据产权登记
信息悖论
信息披露
信号理论
data property registration
information paradox
information disclosure
signaling theory