洛克与康德国家理论的现实意涵:一个非正统的观点

The Practical Implications of Locke and Kant's State Theories:An Uncommon View

一般认为,相对于洛克的“社会契约论”,康德的国家理论在评判当代现实中的国家时较不易得出“哲学无政府主义”的结论;这是因为,不同于洛克的政治自愿主义,康德认为人们有义务进入“法权状态”,因而国家正当性不依赖于每个公民的同意,这一点恰恰与“很少公民明确表达同意”的政治现实相契合。与主流观点相反,本文主张,相较于康德的理论,洛克的政治理论经重构后反而更不易导向“哲学无政府主义”。为了支持此主张,我将论证:(1)洛克的自愿主义论证并不成立,其自然权利学说经恰当重构,实则蕴含功能主义的正当性理论,按此理论设定的正当性条件能被现实中的一些国家满足,以及(2)康德虽然明确持非自愿主义的国家理论,但法权状态所要求的追踪“普遍的联合意志”的制度条件远非现实中的国家所能满足,因此其理论反而带有更强的哲学无政府主义的实践意涵。

It is commonly held that compared to Locke's“social contract”,Kant's state theory is more capable of resisting anarchists'skepticism of state legitimacy.This is so,according to this common view,because in contrast to Locke's political voluntarism,Kant argues that individuals have a duty to be in the“rightful condition”,which means that state legitimacy does not rely on individual subjects'consent.In this paper,however,I attempt to argue for an uncommon view that Locke's state theory,with a proper reconstruction,would show greater promise in resisting philosophical anarchism than Kant's.My view consists of two contentions.First,I contend that Locke's argument for political voluntarism fails;his doctrine of natural rights entails a functionalist view of state legitimacy,according to which,there are at least some existing states that function well and are therefore legitimate.Second,I contend that beneath Kant's involutaristic political theory is his lofty idea that a rightful condition is a condition where“the general united will”guides the legislative will,which requires a set of political institutions that no existing states ever implement,and thus his theory easily invites philosophical anarchism.