自然律的实质主义进路及其问题

The Quidditism Approach to the Law of Nature and Its Problems

在自然律形而上学研究的视角下,实质主义基于解释性质与例示之间的相互关系,就自然律是否具有必然性这一问题做出了回答。从实质主义关于性质的揭示来看,对于“殊型性质”与“类型性质”的折中,促成一种“亚里士多德形而上学式”的本体论取向。基于此立场,实质主义内部催生出两种关于解释自然律的理论路径,分别强调性质之例示与性质自身在解释自然律中的本体论意义,但两条路径都否认自然律的彻底必然性,难以摆脱休谟主义。深化关于自然律的形而上学研究,需要重新反思已有研究的本体论预设,进一步对自然律具有何种程度的必然性做出解读。

From the perspective of analytical metaphysics research on law of nature,Quidditism answers the question of whether law of nature are necessary based on the interrelationship between property and instantiation.From the perspective of Quidditism revealing of property,the compromise between"particularity property"and"property of type"has led to an ontological orientation of"Aristotelian metaphysics".Based on this position,two theoretical paths have emerged within Quidditism regarding the interpretation of law of nature,emphasizing respectively the ontological significance of the instantiation of property and the property itself in the interpretation of law of nature.However,both paths deny the complete necessity of law of nature,making it difficult to cast off Humean.To deepen the metaphysical research on law of nature,it is necessary to rethink the ontological assumptions of existing research and further interpret the degree of necessity of law of nature.