非控股大股东信息交互的公司治理效应:投资效率的视角

The Corporate Governance Effect of Information Interaction Among Non‑Controlling Majority Shareholders:A Perspective on Investment Efficiency

非控股大股东的信息交互究竟会协同监督控股股东,还是与控股股东合谋掏空中小投资者利益?这有待实证检验。为此,本文基于非控股大股东共同持股关系构建信息网络,研究非控股大股东信息交互对公司投资效率的影响。结果表明,非控股大股东信息交互提高了公司投资效率,支持了“监督效应”假设。机制检验表明,非控股大股东信息交互可以促使其采用“用手投票”和退出威胁的方式参与公司治理。在代理问题严重或信息不对称程度较高的公司中,非控股大股东信息交互对投资效率的影响更加显著,进一步验证了“监督效应”假设。本文排除信息交互频繁的公司拥有更多资金或资源的解释,检验非控股大股东信息交互提高投资效率的经济后果,证实由非控股大股东共同持股形成的信息网络间存在私有信息交互。总之,本文从非控股大股东信息交互视角丰富和发展了公司治理研究,为改善公司治理结构和引导资本市场健康发展提供了重要的参考价值。

Will the information interaction among non‑controlling majority shareholders lead to their supervision of the controlling shareholder,or will it result in collusion with the controlling shareholder to detrimentally impact the interests of small and medium‑sized investors?To address this question,this paper constructs a shareholder information network based on shareholding data and examines the influence of information interaction among non‑controlling majority shareholders on corporate investment efficiency.The findings reveal that information interaction among non‑controlling majority shareholders enhances corporate investment efficiency.Even after conducting endogeneity and robustness tests,this conclusion remains robust,supporting the hypothesis of a‘monitoring effect’.Further analysis of the influencing mechanism demonstrates that information interaction can incentivize non‑controlling majority shareholders to engage in corporate governance through methods such as“voting by hand”and the threat of withdrawal.Heterogeneity tests indicate that in companies plagued by severe agency problems or high information asymmetry,the positive correlation between information exchange and corporate investment efficiency is particularly pronounced,aligning with the‘monitoring effect’hypothesis.In further analysis,this paper integrates the corporate financial constraint index and regional financial market development index into the regression model.The findings reveal that the influence of information interaction among non‑controlling majority shareholders on investment efficiency remains consistent,dispelling the notion that companies engaging in frequent information exchange may possess greater resources or operate in provinces with more advanced financial development.Subsequently,this paper investigates the economic consequences of information interaction among non‑controlling majority shareholders in enhancing investment efficiency and discovers improvements in both corporate and market performance.Lastly,this paper validates the presence of private information exchange within the co‑shareholding network.The conclusions drawn in this paper offer significant implications for relevant policies.Firstly,the government could establish incentive mechanisms to encourage non‑controlling majority shareholders to actively engage in corporate governance,thereby effectively supervising and constraining the behavior of controlling shareholders.Moreover,facilitating communication and collaboration among non‑controlling majority shareholders,perhaps through the establishment of industry associations or organizational platforms,could promote opportunities for information sharing and resource integration.Secondly,the government should implement stricter information disclosure systems and norms,mandating listed companies and their controlling shareholders to provide more timely,accurate,and comprehensive disclosures.This initiative would enhance market transparency and investors’access to information,consequently mitigating information asymmetry.Furthermore,the government should actively encourage the participation of foreign institutional investors by streamlining the foreign investment admission process,improving the investment environment,and enhancing legal protection levels.This would bolster the supervision of listed companies and their controlling shareholders.Lastly,the government should establish stringent industry regulatory norms to guide external supervisory agencies,such as analysts and accounting firms,in objectively and fairly evaluating the financial and operational status of listed companies.Additionally,it should intensify the protection of the interests of small and medium‑sized shareholders through the formulation of relevant regulations and policies.