企业股权网络结构与股价暴跌风险——来自中国市场的证据

Cross-shareholding network structure and corporate stock price crash risk—Evidence from capital market

与传统的企业股权关系相比,日益复杂的交叉持股形成的股权网络使企业能够更好地获得信息和资源,从而缓解企业各类风险.但股权网络结构对企业股价暴跌风险的影响机理尚不明晰.本文采取社会网络分析方法,基于2007–2021年中国市场数据,考察了上市企业股权网络结构特征对股价暴跌风险的影响机制.研究发现,在中国市场上,居于股权网络结构的战略位置,能够为企业带来协同治理优势.居于网络核心位置的企业,可以凭借信息与资源优势,以及声誉机制等治理手段,部分消除控股股东与管理者之间的信息不对称,治理管理者窖藏坏消息行为,从而削弱企业未来股价暴跌风险.这一结论经过一系列稳健性检验后仍然成立.进一步研究表明,产权制度和区域经济发展差异并不影响股权网络结构对企业股价暴跌风险的抑制作用,但在非国有企业和经济欠发达地区的企业,该治理效果更为明显.本文的研究结果证实企业股权网络结构形成的社会关系有助于改善企业内部治理环境,拓展丰富了企业股价暴跌风险影响因素的研究,对防范企业股价暴跌风险具有重要的实践意义.

The increasingly complex network of cross-holding among listed companies makes it easier for enterprises to acquire information and resources in terms of risk sharing.Nonetheless,the transmission mechanism as to how this network exerts an effect in crash risk of stock price is not obvious.In this paper,we investigate how the ownership network structure influences corporate stock crash price risks by using the Chinese stock market data from 2007 to 2021.It is unraveled that being in the center of the network brings about synergistic governance advantage.Corporations in the core can partially offset the asymmetric information between board and manager through advantages in information,resources,and reputation.They are capable of dealing with negative information withheld by the managers so as to alleviate the crash risk of stock price.This result holds under a series of robustness check.We further show that property ownership and regional development heterogeneity do not affect the fact that equity network structure reduces the risk of stock crash,yet this reduction effect is more pronounced in nonstate-owned enterprises and firms in less developed areas.This paper corroborates that the complicated network of cross shareholding in modern enterprises helps improve the internal corporate governance,extends and deepens the research in the factors that lead to equity price risks.