记忆怀疑论:理解与破解

Memory Scepticism:Demystified and Defanged

记忆一般被视作知识最重要的来源之一,但记忆怀疑论主张,记忆并不能为我们提供关于过往事件的知识。现有文献中,两类记忆怀疑论最常被讨论,它们分别是基于记忆可靠性和基于不完全决定性的怀疑论。针对这两类怀疑论,当下最具代表性的两种回应方案分别借用了解释主义和析取主义的理论资源。文章首先指出了这两种回应各自的不足:解释主义回应无法证明诉诸记忆可靠性的解释为何是“最佳”的,且有循环论证之嫌;析取主义回应无法保证记忆在典型情况下一定具有事实性。随后,文章提出了一种新回应思路:上述两类怀疑论论证都存在“自我空洞化”问题,即,这些论证的结论会导致其前提丧失合理性基础。

Memory is ordinarily taken to be one of the most fundamental sources of knowledge.However,memory sceptics argue that memory is unable to provide us with knowledge about the past.In the existing literature,there are two most discussed forms of memory sceptical arguments,namely,the argument from memory reliability and the argument from underdetermination.Correspondingly,the two most representative anti-sceptical proposals nowadays attempt to disarm the two sceptical arguments by employing explanationism and disjunctivism respectively.This paper will first illustrate their defects:The explanationist response fails to explain why the common-sense explanation is preferable.Besides,it succumbs to the petitio principi fallacy.The disjunctivist response fails to establish that memorial experiences are factive in paradigmatic cases.After that,a novel solution will be proposed,according to which memory sceptical arguments are self-hollowing,viz,their conclusions deprive their premises of the foundation of plausibility.