基于政府补贴的供应链绿色投入博弈分析

Game Analysis of Green Investment in a Supply Chain under Government Subsidy

针对制造商绿色投入不足的问题,构建由政府、制造商和零售商组成的供应链系统。供应链系统的决策过程为由政府、制造商和零售商组成的三阶段Stackelberg博弈。在考虑政府补贴和制造商绿色投入的供应链中,探讨政府补贴对供应链成员利润、制造商绿色投入水平和社会福利水平的影响。结果表明:社会福利是关于补贴率的凹函数,其由增到减的临界点与绿色投入的外部效益系数成正相关。制造商利润是关于产品绿色度的凹函数,其由增到减的临界点与补贴率成正相关。虽然政府补贴可以促使制造商提升产品绿色度并实现供应链系统的帕累托改进,但当政府补贴率超过一定范围时,持续增加政府补贴会对供应链绩效产生负面影响,这一结论为新能源汽车领域的骗补行为给出了理论上的解释。

Aiming at the problem of insufficient green investment of a manufacturer,this paper established a supply chain system consisting of the government,a manufacturer and a retailer.The decision-making process of the supply chain system can be viewed as a three-stage Stackelberg game composed of the government,the manufacturer and the retailer.In the supply chain considering government subsidies and green investment of the manufacturer,the impacts of government subsidies on the profit of supply chain members,the level of green investment of the manufacturer and the level of social welfare were explored.The results show that social welfare is a concave function of the government subsidy rate,and its critical point from increase to decrease is positively correlated with the external benefit coefficient of green investment.Manufacturer profit is a concave function of the green level of products,and its critical point from increase to decrease is positively related to the government subsidy rate.Government subsidies can enhance manufacturer's green level of products and achieve Pareto improvement of the supply chain system,but when the government subsidy rate exceeds a certain range,continuous increase of government subsidies will have a negative impact on the supply chain performance.The conclusion of this paper gives a theoretical explanation for the deception behavior in the field of new energy vehicles.