摘要
情感儒学虽然对理性本体具有积极的纠偏作用,但依然存在着主体性困限,即情感本体与理性本体一样,最终确证人作为主体是自足自明的无限存在者,这既存在理论疑难,也存在现实风险。当代儒家通过借鉴现象学的方法突破了主体哲学的现成对象化视域,为克服主体性困限带来了转机。首先有学者通过“感”的生存论阐释,突破了情理二分的现成化心灵模式,消解了情感与理性的本体之争,揭示生存体验的“感”之于主体性情感和理性的先行性;进而又有学者溯源性的追问“感”何以可能,通过“情”的本源论解蔽,揭示“情”对于“感”的源始居有性。据此可知,主体情感根植于“感”,而“感”渊源于“情”,因此人作为主体是非自明、非自足的有限存在者。要走出情感本体的主体性困限,势必正视这一实情并推进相关的理论革新。
The ontology of Emotion Confucianism mainly holds that our minds or human beings are self-sufficient and self-evident subjects,which result in the defects of being unlimited in subject both in theory and in reality,though it corrects the malpractices of reason subject actively. However,contemporary Confucians have broken the view of subjective philosophy and brought a turnaround of overcoming the defect mentioned above by drawing lessons from the method of Phenomenology,Firstly,by interpreting gan 感( sense) in the view of existentialism,some scholars reveal “sense as beings”more priority than subjective emotion and reason,which breaks out of the mind model with the emotion and reason of the ready-made subject and dissolves the conflict of ontology between emotion and reason.Then,by further pursuing how is “sense as beings”possible,other scholars put forward the theory of Being to explain that circumstance as Being itself shapes sense as beings in the original place. And based on the above considerations,it can be inferred that subjective emotion is booted in sense as beings,and sense as beings is originated from circumstances as Being itself. Therefore,the human as subject is not a being of self-sufficient and self-evident. If we get out of the subjective dilemma,we must face up to this aspect squarely and develop the relative research now.
出处
《国际儒学(中英文)》
CSSCI
2024年第1期50-57,185,共9页
International Studies on Confucianism
关键词
情感主体
生存论
本源论
主体有限性
subject
sense
existentialism
circumstance
the theory of Being
finiteness