摘要
考虑制造商既可直销也可通过零售商将产品销售给消费者的双渠道供应链,制造商和零售商均可提供免费延保服务以吸引消费者进行信息注册,获取消费者信息,从而获得潜在收益.基于此,研究免费延保服务的提供和消费者渠道偏好对供应链成员定价和利润的影响.结果表明,免费延保服务的提供方会索要更高的零售价格.当零售商提供免费延保服务时,制造商会提高产品的批发价格.提供免费延保服务使得供应链主体利润增加,但并不一定由自身提供达到最优.此外,当制造商为双渠道提供免费延保时,制造商自身提供免费延保服务总是最优选择,而制造商提供免费延保服务并不优于零售商自身提供免费延保服务.研究结论为企业提供免费延保服务的创新实践提供理论依据.
This paper considers a dual-channel supply chain in which a manufacturer sells its products directly or through a retailer to consumers.Both the manufacturer and the retailer can offer complimentary extended warranties to attract consumers to register information for potential benefits.Based on this framework,this paper examines the effects of offering complimentary extended warranty and consumers’channel preferences on the price and the profit of supply chain members.The results show that the suppliers of complimentary extended warranties charge higher retail prices.The manufacturer increases the wholesale price when the re-tailer provides a complimentary extended warranty.Offering complimentary extended warranties makes supply chain members more profitable,but their profits may not necessarily be the highest when the complimentary extended warranty are provided by themselves.Furthermore,when the manufacturer provides complimentary extended warranties for both channels,it is always optimal for the manufacturer to provide the warranty him-self,but it may not always result in a higher profit for the retailer.These results can provide a theoretical basis forfirms to implement complimentary extended warranties in practice.
作者
吕珊珊
郭梦瑾
刘国伟
LÜ Shanshan;Guo Mengjin;Liu Guowei(School of Economics and Management,Hebei University of Technology,Tianjin 300401,China)
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2024年第2期272-285,共14页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(72002066、71801078、71902138)
教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目(19YJC630117).
关键词
免费延保
双渠道供应链
定价策略
博弈论
complimentary extended warranty
dual-channel supply chain
pricing strategy
game theory