三方视角下的军事危机应对策略演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Military Crisis Response Strategies from a Tripartite Perspective

针对域外强国介入时形成的“2强1弱”军事危机三方博弈系统,对各方策略影响因素进行分析,运用演化博弈论建立包括引发方、干预方、应对方的博弈模型,分析三方策略稳定性,并构建系统动力学模型进行仿真实验,研究三方策略选择初始概率与应对方对引发方反击强度等参数对策略演化影响。结果表明:引发方、干预方、应对方分别采取坚持对抗、积极干预、进取应对策略的初始概率,对各自策略的演化发展都有影响;增大应对方对引发方反击程度,有助于扭转引发方及干预方演化发展方向;当干预方积极干预时,只加强应对方对引发方的反击强度是不够的,还应当提高应对方进取应对的初始概率,才能推动引发方策略朝着妥协退让方法发展。

Considering the tripartite game system of“2 strong and 1 weak”,in the case that extraterritorial power intervenes the military crisis,this paper analyzes the influence factors of three parts’strategies in military crisis.It uses the evolutionary game theory to establish the evolutionary game model of the strategies for trigger(MCT),intervener(MCI)and responder(MCR)in military crisis,then it analyzes the stability of three parts’strategies,and establishes the system dynamics(SD)model for simulation experiments.Finally,it analyzes the influences of the initial probabilities of tripartite strategy selection,and the counterattack intensity of the MCR to MCT.The results are as follows:the independent initial probabilities of MCT,MCI and MCR to choose confrontation,active intervention and aggressive response,all exert an important impact on the evolution of their respective strategy.Increasing the degree of counterattack by the MCR against the MCT will help reverse the strategies’development of MCI and MCT.When MCI chooses active intervention,it’s not enough to increase the degree of counterattack by the MCR against the MCT,and it’s also necessary for MCR to raise the initial probability of aggressive response to reverse MCT’s strategy.