环境规制下政府监管与企业协作配送策略演化稳定性研究

Stability of government regulation and enterprise cooperative distribution strategy under environmental regulation

政府和企业联盟是协作配送低碳减排的主要参与者,研究政企之间的利益关系对于促进减排具有重要意义。在我国环境规制政策的背景下,借助演化博弈理论探讨了政府监管决策对企业联盟协作配送策略选择的演化过程,建立了政府监管和企业联盟协作低碳配送的演化博弈模型。随后进行数值仿真,模拟政府和企业联盟的动态演化过程,得到4种稳定均衡策略。研究结果表明,政府初始监管比例越大,企业联盟趋向于稳定策略的速度越快。政府应提高监管意愿,设置高于阈值的环境税率,引导企业联盟协作低碳配送,从而达到低碳减排的目的。

Government and enterprise alliance are the main participants in collaborative distribution of low carbon emission reduction.It is of great significance to study the interest relationship between government and enterprise for promoting emission reduction.Under the background of environmental regulation policy in China,the evolution process of government regulation decision on cooperative distribution of enterprise alliance was discussed by evolutionary game theory,and an evolutionary game model of government regulation and enterprise cooperative distribution strategy was established.By simulating the dynamic evolution process of the alliance between government and enterprises,four stable equilibrium strategies were obtained.The results showed that the larger the proportion of initial government supervision was,the faster the alliance tends to be stable.The government should improve the regulatory willingness,set environmental tax rates higher than the threshold value,and guide enterprises to cooperate in low-carbon distribution,so as to achieve the goal of low-carbon emission reduction.