摘要
本文基于奖励结构理论,提出了体制引力理论并建立了一个两部门模型,以此解释中国的人才配置格局及其对企业全要素生产率的影响和作用机制。实证研究表明:反映体制部门比较优势的显性体制引力显著抑制了企业全要素生产率的提升,诱导人才向体制部门过量配置和对创新外溢效应的抑制是主要机制。此外,显性体制引力的作用还会通过体制部门隐性比较优势,即社会网络、超额报酬和福利与薪酬保障等得到进一步放大。本研究对理解人才错配的制度根源和精准改进人才配置效率具有一定的理论价值和现实意义。
Based on the theory of reward structure,we formulate a concept,system gravity,and use it to explain the talent allocation in China.Furthermore,we construct a two-sector model to describe the underlying mechanisms of system gravity.The results of our empirical works show that the dominant system gravity of public sector significantly inhibits a firm's TFP,and this result still holds after a series of robustness tests.Firm's TFP is mainly inhibited by system gravity through talent misallocation and suppression of innovation spillover effect.We further show that effect of explicit system gravity is amplified by implicit system gravity,such as social network,job security,etc.
作者
王炜哲
赵忠
胡凯
WANG Weizhe;ZHAO Zhong;HU Kai(Renmin University of China;South-Central Minzu University)
出处
《经济学(季刊)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第2期605-623,共19页
China Economic Quarterly
基金
国家社科基金一般项目(19BJL079)的资助。
关键词
体制引力
人才配置
全要素生产率
system gravity
talents allocation
total factor productivity