摘要
柏格森的“二元论”重新定义了物质,并利用当时的大脑神经科学的最新成果,提出了自己的身心观——即身体不是精神或记忆的仓库,而仅仅是生命体行动的工具,精神或记忆无论如何都不是大脑的产物。他的“二元论”本质上不是传统意义上的二元论。实际上是一种现代哲学的典型思维方式。其一方面来自于对传统问题的解决,另一方面又是他的新体系得以成立的必要条件。它跨越了新旧两个时代,这也使柏格森成为跨越新旧两个时代的现代哲学的伟大先行者。
This paper discussed the dualism of Bergson and its essence. Bergson redefined the matter in his dualism by using the newest achievements in brain science at his age, and advanced a new theory of mind- body which argues that the body is not a storehouse of mind or memory, but just a tool of action of human, and that the mind or memory is also not the product of brain. His new dualism, on the one hand, is attributed to the solution of the traditional problem; on the other hand is the essential condition for his new philosophy. It strides across the old age and the new age, and makes Bergson to be a great pioneer of the contemporary western philosophy.
出处
《自然辩证法通讯》
CSSCI
北大核心
2002年第6期27-31,6,共6页
Journal of Dialectics of Nature