考虑公众噪音信息的PPP项目政府监管效率研究

Study on the efficiency of government supervision of PPP projects considering public noise information

公众参与PPP项目监管作为监管体系的补充受到越来越多的重视,公众参与项目监管的有效性成为PPP监管体系发展的关键。基于此,本文考虑公众参与项目监管存在噪音信息情形,构建了针对社会资本投机行为的演化博弈模型,并以社会总效用最大化为标准评估政府监管效率。研究表明,公众参与程度提升或公众噪音信息比例的减少均可以有效约束社会资本机会主义行为;但考虑政府监管效率最大化情况下,公众参与程度并非越高越好,而是存在与惩罚系数和公众噪音信息比例有关的最优值。综合分析可知政府监管部门如何有效发挥公众参与项目监管这把双刃剑的作用需要综合考虑公众参与水平、噪音信息比例、政府监管成本和惩罚机制的影响。

As a supplement to the regulatory system,public supervision in PPP project has attracted more and more attention.But the effectiveness of public supervision in project is rarely discussed and verified.Particularly,the public has incomplete information because of the mismatch between their professional ability and supervision ability.It is difficult for the public to give the government completely accurate information.Studies have shown that the public will only participate in projects that they care about or are related to their own interests.This can lead to subjective and inaccurate public evaluations of projects.Finally,the public participation in the supervision of the project is invalid and the project benefits are reduced.In the absence of moral constraints,social laws and regulations,the irrational behavior of the public can easily lead to extreme and emotional online public opinion,which will have a negative impact on society.The lack of real information and irrational behavior will lead to the public′s misjudgment of the real quality information of the project.If the authenticity of the public information is not screened,blindly encouraging the public to participate in the project supervision is likely to lead to redundant project supervision information and reduce the project supervision efficiency.Therefore,combined with the concept of noise information in finance,this paper defines the public supervisory information that deviates from the actual situation of the project as noise information.Based on the evolutionary game theory and social utility equation,this paper established an evolutionary game model between government departments and investors considering the existence of public noise information.By analyzing the decision-making behavior of government departments and investors,this paper studies the influence of public supervision on project efficiency and total social utility.According to the calculation and analysis of the evolutionary stability strategy(ESS)of the evolutionary game,it can be found that in the PPP project supervision system,the phenomenon of“incentive paradox”will appear only by relying on the government supervision department,which cannot effectively suppress the opportunistic behavior of investors.In the initial stage of public supervision in PPP projects,public supervision can decrease the proportion of investors choosing opportunistic behavior.However,low degree of public participation cannot completely inhibit opportunistic behavior of investors.And the increase in the degree of public participation will lead to the decrease of the proportion of investors who choose to speculate.Finally,a stable strategy equilibrium is formed in which investors do not choose to speculate.On the one hand,public supervision can effectively restrain investors’opportunistic behavior and bring positive effects to the project.On the other hand,it will increase the cost of government review.Specifically,the role of the double-edged sword of public supervision is directly affected by the public′s attributes(their willingness to participate and the authenticity of feedback information),supervision cost,review cost and governance mechanism.Furthermore,considering the maximum efficiency of government supervision,the higher the degree of public participation is not the better,and there is an optimal value related to the penalty coefficient and the proportion of public noise information.Comprehensive analysis shows that the construction of government supervision system needs to consider the level of public participation,the proportion of noise information,government supervision costs and punishment mechanisms.To effectively play the positive role of the double-edged sword of public participation in project supervision.In summary,increasing public participation in PPP projects and reducing the proportion of noise information can not only control the moral hazard behavior of investors,but also improve the efficiency of government supervision.Public noise information comes from the public′s lack of projects’real information.Therefore,government departments should first establish a project information disclosure mechanism.Increase transparency of project information through timely disclosure of project construction and operation information.Secondly,when providing supervisory information to the public,a timely communication and feedback mechanism should be established.Initial screening of information provided by the public can eliminate some of the noise that can be identified through communication and feedback.This paper mainly discussed the interaction mechanism between government supervision department and investors and analyzed the main influencing factors of opportunistic behavior under the condition of public participation in project supervision and noise information.It can not only provide theoretical reference for government supervision departments to make operational decisions and improve the efficiency of supervision in practice,but also put forward targeted suggestions to curb investors’opportunistic behavior.